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ESTOPPEL BY RULE: THE COMPULSORY COUNTER-
CLAIM UNDER MODERN PLEADIN'G*
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT**
Most lawyers are moderately familiar with the doctrine of res
judicata, by which a second suit on one cause of action is pro-
hibited. And some lawyers know about collateral estoppel, a doc-
trine which provides that the decision of a court on an issue actu-
ally before it must be taken as final in subsequent litigation between
the same parties even though the second suit is on a different cause
of action. In recent years attention has been turning to a third type
of bar, by which the termination of one suit may prevent a party
thereto from ever presenting to a court another claim which he has.
This bar is created by the so-called "compulsory counterclaim" rules
and statutes. These rules and statutes provide that a party must
present certain kinds of claims as counterclaims in litigation against
him, on pain of being otherwise precluded from ever having a day
in court as to these claims.
The idea of the compulsory counterclaim is not new. Professor
Millar traces the origins of the device back to a New Jersey statute
of 1722 in relation to set-off.' And a number of states followed the
lead of an 1875 California statute, still in effect in amended form,
which is not greatly dissimilar from the most modern version of a
compulsory counterclaim rule. The real stimulus to emphasis on
compulsory counterclaims, however, has come from the recent
reexamination of procedures which has led ten jurisdictions to fol-
*[Ed. Com.] This Article was prepared for a Symposium on Res Judicata
appearing in the Winter, 1954, Issue of the Iowa Law Review. Because it
contains much which is pertinent to the current controversy as to whether tort
counterclaims are compulsory in Minnesota - see particularly pp. 445-450 and
458-465 - it is here reprinted with permission from Professor Wright and the
Editors of the Iowa Law Review.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Assistant to the
Reporter, United States Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Rules of
Civil Procedure. Secretary, Minnesota State Bar Association Court Rules
Committee
1. Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective
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low the Federal Courts in the adoption of systems of "modern
pleading,"2 systems in which the compulsory counterclaim has been
among the most important reforms.
It is my purpose in this paper to examine the actual working
of these statutes and rules providing for compulsory counterclaims,
after which it will be possible to weigh with some assurance the
various comments which have been made about this new kind of
estoppel by both friends and critics of this device.
THE RULES AND STATUTES
Rules (and statutes) providing some compulsion on a party,
usually the defendant, to plead his claim as a counterclaim in a
pending action take many forms. Easily the most popular is that
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 (a) :
"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at
the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that such
a claim need not be so stated if at the time the action was com-
menced the claim was the subject of another pending action."
Rules which are substantially identical with this are now effective
in Alaska,2 Arizona,4 Delaware, 5 Florida," Kentucky,7 Missouri,"
2. I regard a state as having adopted "modern pleading" if it enjoys, at
least in substantial part, three things: (1) A real and effective merger of
the forms of action and of law and equity; (2) Simplified pleading, supple-
mented by a broad system of pretrial devices for getting at the merits; (3)
Unlimited joinder of claim and parties. Wright, Modern Pleading and the
Pennsylvania Rules, 101 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 909, 913 (1953). By this test,
modern pleading has been adopted in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Utah, as
well as in the federal courts. Delaware has adopted rules patterned on the
Federal Rules, but has preserved separate systems of law and equity. Many
jurisdictions other than those listed have adopted particular features of the
modern pleading systems, including, as will be seen, the compulsory counter-
claim rule.
3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) is made applicable to the Alaska courts by
28 U. S. C. § 2072 (Supp. 1952).
4. Ariz. Code § 21-437 (1939).
5. Del. Rules of Superior Court, Rule 13(a) ; Del. Rules of Court of
Chancery, Rule 13a.
6. Fla. Stat. § 52.11(1) (1943). It is something of a puzzle that the
counterclaim provisions of § 52.11 were not moved into the 1950 rules of
common law procedure adopted by the Florida court. Professor Philip K.
Yonge, of the College of Law of the University of Florida, advises me that
both the legislature and the Supreme Court of Florida have the power to
enunciate procedural law, and thus that no significance need be attached to the
failure to promulgate the counterclaim provisions with the rules of court.
Professor Yonge is of the opinion that the cited statute is not applicable in
equitable proceedings in Florida, as the court has regulated counterclaims in
equity by Equity Rule 35, adopted in 1950. A proposed consolidation of the
(Vol. 38:423
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Nevada,9 New Mexico, 10 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1 Texas,12
and UtahY3 And the Iowa rule is to the same effect, though in dif-
ferent language.' 4 Further the Minnesota rule is identical with
Federal Rule 13(a) save that it substitutes "transaction" for the
possibly more inclusive "transaction or occurrence" of the federal
rule ;101 whether this difference in language should produce any
change in result will be examined with some care subsequently.
Another popular kind of enactment is that of California:
"If the defendant omits to set up a counterclaim upon a cause
arising out of the transaction set forth in the complaint as the
foundation of the plaintiff's claim, neither he nor his assignee
can afterwards maintain an action against the plaintiff there-
for.""'
But the California situation is not so straightforward as it appears
on the surface, for "counterclaim" is defined by the California Code
as that which tends "to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recov-
ery." 7 If the defendant wishes affirmative relief, not tending to
diminish or defeat his adversary's recovery, he must proceed by
law and equity rules, which would leave separate law and equity courts, but
provide the same basic rules for both courts, much as in Delaware, note 5
supra, drops Equity Rule 35 completely, moves § 52.11 from the statutes to
the rules, and makes this single rule applicable to both law and equity.
7. Ky. R. Civ. P. 13.01. Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil
Procedure in Kentucky in 1953, Kentucky had a statute of the sort discussed
at pp. 426-427 infra, which forbade the recovery of costs in an independent
action on a claim which could have been pleaded as a counterclaim in an
earlier suit. Ky. Code, Civ. Prac. § 17 (Carroll 1938).
8. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 509.420 (1949). Though compulsory counterclaims
were thus provided for, the Missouri Code made no provision for permissive
counterclaims. This omission was cured by the adoption in 1944 of Mo.
Sup. Ct. Rule 3.16, which is along the same lines as Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
9. Nev. R. Civ. P. 13 (a). Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1953, Nevada had a statute, similar to the California statute
discussed at pp. 425-426 infra, making certain counterclaims compulsory. Nev.
Comp. Laws § 8604 (1929).
10. N. M. R. Civ. P. 13(a), N. M. Stat. § 19-101 (13) (a) (1941).
11. P. R. R. Civ. P. 13(a). The Puerto Rico Rules of Civil Procedure,
adopted in 1944, may be found at the rear of volume 60 of the Puetro Rico
Reports.
12. Tex. R. Civ. P. 97(a).
13. Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a). Utah had a somewhat similar compulsory
counterclaim provision prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1950. Utah Code § 104-9-3 (1943).
14. Iowa R. Civ. P. 29.
15. Minn. R. Civ. P. 13.01. The history as to how the Minnesota Rule
came to take this form is recounted in Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties
under Modcrn Pleading Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 580, 588-591 (1952).
16. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 439 (Deering 1949). It is probable that others
may be perplexed, as I have been, by the notation in Deering's edition of the
Code that an earlier form of this statute was held unconstitutional in 1901. I
find that what happened was that an entire codification of California law was
voided because of a defective title, Lewis v. Dunne, 134 Cal. 291, 66 Pac. 478
(1901), and thus that the decision does not reflect on the constitutionality of
making counterclaims compulsory.
17. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 438 (Deering 1949).
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way of cross-complaint rather than counterclaim. A cross-com-
plaint may be made on any claim "relating to or depending upon
the contract, transaction, matter, happening or accident upon which
the action is brought," 18 and the filing of such a cross-complaint is
always at the option of the pleader, in theory at least, rather than
compelled by statute. This rather complex scheme is followed,
though with differences of language, in the statutes of Idaho"0 and
Montana 20 and was also in Nevada before its recent adoption of
modern pleading.21
Other states have chosen to go their own rather strange ways.
New Jersey, though it has adopted modem pleading generally, has
preferred to make compulsory only those counterclaims which arise
from "a liquidated debt or demand, or a debt or demand capable
of being ascertained by calculation." 22 West Virginia, though it pro-
vides for no compulsion in its ordinary trial courts, does have an
intricate statute making certain claims compulsory in suits before
justices of the peace. 2  Since these two states vary so far from the
usual compulsory counterclaim provisions, they will not be further
considered. Nor will further consideration be given to that group
of states, in which is included Indiana,24 Nebraska, 25 Ohio,'2 0 kl a-
18. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 442 (Deering 1949).
19. Idaho Code § 5-614 (1947) compels the pleading of those counter-
claims listed in Idaho Rule of Prac. & Proc. R5-613(1). But Idaho Code §
5-617 (1947), dealing with cross-complaints, is less broad, verbally at least,
than the similar California statute.
20. By virtue of Mont Rev. Codes §§ 93-3408, 93-3401(1) (1947),
counterclaims must be pleaded if they arise "out of the contract or trans-
action" sued upon or are connected with "the subject of the action." The scope
allotted to cross-complaints, which are not compulsory and need not tend to
diminish or defeat plaintiff's recovery, is the same. Mont. Rev. Codes §
93-3415 (1947).
21. See note 9 mtpra
22. N. J. R. R. 4:13-1. This rule was orginally N. J. R. Civ. P. 3:13-1,
and as first promulgated made no provision for compelling counterclaims.
It was amended Dec. 7, 1950, 5 N. 3. 627, to make compulsory those counter-
claims listed in the text. The rule was renumbered, and the rather cryptic
form of citation set out above required by rules, R. R. 1:1-10, in The Revision
of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey effective Sept.
9, 1953.
23. W. Va. Code § 4978 (1949) : "If the defendant in an action founded
on judgment or contract, express or implied, has, at the time the action is
commenced, any counterclaim consisting of a cause of action in his favor
which might have been allowed to him in defense or reduction of the plaintiff's
demand, upon the trial of the action, as provided by the preceding section,
and be personally served with process in the suit or appear and answer the
action, he shall set forth the same, with his evidence in support thereof, in
the cause, or be forever precluded from maintaining any action for the re-
covery thereof." This is qualified, however, by W. Va. Code § 4979(a) (1949),
which makes the counterclaim optional if it exceeds plaintiff's demand by
$300 or more.
24. Ind. Stat. § 2-1019 (Burns 1946 Repl. Vol.).
25. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-814 (1943).
26. Ohio Gen. Code § 11624 (Page 1937).
[Vol. 38:423
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homa,27 and Vyoming, 2 which prohibit the defendant who fails to
counterclaim from recovering costs in a subsequent independent
action on his claim.2
The final statute which does merit consideration is that of
Arkansas:
"* * * [T]he defendant must set out in his answer as many
grounds of defense, counter-claim or set-off, whether legal or
equitable, as he shall have." 30
There are two aspects of this statute worthy of note. One is that
"counterclaim" is defined in the Arkansas statutes as "any cause
of action in favor of the defendants or some of them against the
plaintiffs or some of them."' Thus the compulsion may extend to
claims which bear no relationship whatever to the plaintiff's claim, a
result which is not reached under the more usual rules and statutes.
The other interesting thing is that the Arkansas court has held
that when the legislature substituted "must" for "may" in the
statute quoted above in 1935, it intended to require the pleading
of counterclaims on penalty of a subsequent bar.3 2 Other jurisdic-
tions have statutes which say defendant "must" plead his counter-
claims but, except in Arkansas, such statutes have been construed
as leaving it optional with the defendant to assert a claim as a
counterclaim or to save it for subsequent suit.33
By way of summary, there is a reasonably general compulsion
of counterclaims, in either the Federal, California, or Arkansas
form, in 17 jurisdictions as well as the federal courts. Two other
27. Okla. Stat. tit 12, § 275 (1941).
28. Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-1314 (1945).
29. Kentucky had such a statute prior to 1953. See note 7 supra.
30. Ark. Stat § 27-1121 (1947).
31. Ark. Stat. § 27-1123 (1947).
32. Corey v. The Mercantile Insurance Co. of America, 207 Ark. 284,
ISO S. W. 2d 570 (1944). The substitution of "must" for "may" in the
counterclaim statute was made by Ark. Acts 1935, No. 54, § 1, p. 124. Arkan-
sas distinguishes between counterclaims and set-offs. Though both are now
compelled by the statute cited note 30 supra, an earlier statute remains on the
books forbidding costs in independent action on a claim which might have
been pleaded as a set-off in an earlier suit. Ark. Stat § 27-1128 (1947). The
presence of this anachronism does not seem to have caused any difficulty
in that enlightened jurisdiction.
33. Thus some statutes say: "The answer of the defendant must contain:
1. A general or specific denial. * * * 2. A statement of any new matter con-
stituting a defense or counterclaim." Such statutes have been held to make
it optional with the pleader whether or not to assert a counterclaim. Huether
v. Baird, 62 N. D. 434, 244 N. W. 125 (1932) ; Diamond Ice & Storage Co. v.
Klock Produce Co., 103 Wash. 369, 174 Pac. 435 (1918); Nehring v. Nie-
merowicz, 226 Wis. 285, 291, 276 N. W. 325, 328 (1937). The contrary read-
ing of the Wisconsin statute by the Massachusetts court in Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Hathaway Baking Co., 306 Mass. 428, 28 N. E. 2d 425 (1940), finds
no support in the Wisconsin cases cited or in Wisconsin law generally. See
Advisory Committee Note to Wis. Stat. § 263.14 (1951), which says that all
counterclaims are permissive in Wisconsin.
1954]
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states make counterclaims compulsory in more limited circum-
stances, while five more states do not require counterclaims but do
withhold costs in the second suit from the defendant who has failed
to counterclaim.
THE EFFECTS OF COMPULSION
The statutes which follow the California pattern, as has been
seen, are quite explicit that if the pleader fails to assert a counter-
claim within the compulsory class, "neither he nor his assignee
can afterwards maintain an action against the plaintiff therefor."
Any inquiry into the nature of the compulsion is an exercise in
semantics; the obvious fact is that subsequent suit is prohibited be-
cause the legislature says it is prohibited. The answer is not so
easy in those jurisdictions which have followed the federal model,
for in such jurisdictions, with the exception of Iowa, 4 the rule or
statute says that the pleader "shall" assert certain claims as coun-
terclaims, but is silent as to the penalty, if any, for failure to do
so. 35 Nonetheless it has never been doubted in any of the jurisdic-
tions which have adopted such a rule that the pleader who fails to
comply therewith is prohibited from subsequent assertion of his
claim.
Just how this result is reached is a, subject on which there is
some disagreement, though perhaps it is only on a verbal level.
Harvard writers have been agreed that the familiar doctrines of
"merger" or "bar" preclude the defendant from his later inde-
pendent action.36 In accord with the normal usage of the terms
"merger" and "bar,"37 this would seem to imply that the effect of
a compulsory counterclaim rule is to broaden the scope of the
cause of action deemed to be determined by the judgment. Thus if
the defendant was successful in the first suit he is precluded from
suing later on the claim which should have been counterclaimed
because that claim, like all others arising from the cause of action,
has been merged in the judgment in the first suit. If the defendant
34. Iowa R. Civ. P. 29 concludes: "A final judgment on the merits shall
bar such a counterclaim, although not pleaded.
35. In the Preliminary Draft of May, 1936, of the Federal Rules, it was
expressly provided that: "If the action proceeds to judgment without such
a claim being set up, the claim shall be barred." See note 119 infra for the
history of this proposal. In the Preliminary Draft of April, 1937, the quoted
language was eliminated from the Rule but the seventh paragraph of the
Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 stated, and states, the same
thing in slightly different language. See note 51 infra.
36. Scott, Collateral Estoppel By Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 27
(1942) ; Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 832
(1952).




lost the first action the judgment therein is a bar as to any subse-
quent suit by him on any claims arising from the cause of action
there adjudicated. Professor Moore, with some judicial support,
places the prohibition against a second suit on the ground that
"the principle of res judicata applies to all issues that should
have been raised, even though actually omitted."3
This is probably saying the same thing as the Harvard people do,
for Moore's statement can be correct only on the assumption that
there is but one cause of action; otherwise res judicata can have
no application, and the relevant doctrine is that of collateral estop-
pel, which has not customarily applied to unlitigated issues.
Other authorities have preferred to support the bar against later
suit by the theory of "waiver." 3  Analysis of the compulsory coun-
terclaim in terms of "waiver," or of actual "estoppel," as I prefer,
might offer some advantage. 40 It would afford a means, if such be
thought desirable, of extricating from the rigors of the compulsory
rule the defendant who has never knowingly refrained from insert-
ing his claim, a situation which is particularly important where an
insurance company has controlled the defense of the first action.
And analysis in terms of "waiver" or "estoppel" might be a more
flexible tool for handling the cases of the default judgment or the
consent judgment or the dismissal after a compromise agreement.
A comparatively recent decision may serve to illustrate this
idea. The case is that of Keller v. Keklikian,41 now commonly
presented as the chief horrible example by those who are critical
of the compulsory counterclaim device. Keklikian sued Keller for
damages incurred in a collision between their cars. Keller turned
the papers over to his insurer as he was required to do by his in-
surance policy. Before the time for answering the complaint had
expired-apparently because of extensions by agreement-Kekli-
kian's lawyer and the lawyer for the insurance company agreed on
a settlement of the claim and entered into a stipulation that the
38. 3 Moore, Federal Practice ff 13.12 (2d ed. 1948). See Switzer
Brothers, Inc. v. Locklin, 207 F. 2d 483, 488 (7th Cir. 1953); Biaett v.
Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 70 Ariz. 164, 170, 217 P. 2d 923, 926-927 (1950) ;
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Industrial Corp., 154 F. 2d 814,
817 (2d Cir. 1946) (dissenting opinion)
39. See State ex rel. lack v. Scott, 235 S. W. 2d 106, 111 (Mo. App.
1950) ; see Howell, Counterclaims and Cross-Complaints in California, 10 So.
Calif. L. Rev. 415, 454-458 (1937) ; 2 St. Louis U. L. J. 195, 197 (1952).
40. I would be the first to agree that it is nonsense to decide cases by
labels, and that even a child will realize that there is no reason why a doctrine,
such as res judicata, should have the same incidents when applied to counter-
claims as it has had in other contexts. But until all judges and lawyers
realize this, it is necessary to choose one's labels so that they may be properly
used even by conceptualists.
41. 362 Mo. 919, 244 S. W. 2d 1001 (1951).
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action should be dismissed with prejudice. Thereupon the court
ordered dismissal. Seven weeks later Keller sued Keklikian for
injuries from the same collision. The Missouri Supreme Court
upheld a judgment on the pleadings for the defendant on the sole
ground that Keller's claim was barred by his failure to plead it as
a compulsory counterclaim in the first action.4 2 If the effect of com-
pulsion of counterclaims is analyzed in terms of the application of
usual principles of res judicata, or of merger and bar, to an en-
larged cause of action, the result seems inevitable. On this analysis
the counterclaim statute is said to require that Keller's claim be
regarded as a part of the cause of action on which Keklikian sued,
and thus Keller's claim becomes merged in the judgment against
Keldikian. And a consent judgment is as much entitled to be re-
garded as res judicata as is any other.43 If, on the other hand, the
Missouri court had thought here in terms of "waiver," as had an
inferior Missouri court, 44 a different result might have been pos-
sible. By relying on authorities, to be discussed hereafter, that an
insurance company is not the agent of its insured for purposes of
binding him by a settlement, 45 it would have been easy for the court
to say that Keller had never personally waived his claim and that
the insurer cannot waive it for him.48 Whether such leniency is
desirable is, of course, a different question, and one which we will
take up later.
There is actually no clear line of authority as to whether the
penalties for failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim apply
where the first action results in a consent or default judgment, a
42. The court did indicate that this result might have been avoided had
Keller moved to have the first judgment set aside, or claimed that he failed
to set up his counterclaim through "oversight, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect," the language of the omitted counterclaim rule. Id. at 825, 244 S. W.
2d at 1004.
43. Restatement, Judgments § 47, comment a (1942) ; Note, Collateral
Estoppel By Judgment, 52 Col. L. Rev. 647, 654, 657 (1952).
44. State ex rel. Mack v. Scott, 235 S. W. 2d 106, 111 (Mo. App. 1950).
45. Burnham v. Williams, 198 Mo. App. 18, 194 S. W. 751 (1917), and
cases cited note 167 infra.
46. A student commentator says:
"If the result of the Keller case seems harsh it should be remembered
that the defendant had ample opportunity to counterclaim and had not
availed himself of it and apparently had not indicated any intention of
doing so. Moreover, he had by voluntary agreement accepted the defense
of the attorneys for the insurance company."
2 St. Louis U. L. J. 195, 199 (1952). Both branches of the argument are un-
realistic. Keller was foreclosed before the time allowed him to counterclaim
had expired, even if it be assumed that he knew of his rights and duties under
the circumstances. Nor had Keller "voluntarily" accepted the defense of the
company's attorneys; as a part of the standard contract of insurance, he
was compelled to be defended by them whether he liked it or not. At best
he could name his own attorney to assist in the defense, but control of the
defense would still remain with the company.
[Vol. 38:423
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result which must be reached if the basis for compulsion is res
judicata. The Keller case just discussed did reach such a result, as
did the Montana court in considering the effect of a default judg-
ment. 4 7 On the other hand, the Iowa rule is quite clear that only
a "final judgment on the merits" can bar the defendant from
bringing a second suit4 and dicta from one federal district court
points in the same direction. 9 The only other federal court to con-
sider the question indicated that it believed a dismissal with
prejudice of the first action should prevent the non-counterclaiming
defendant from bringing a second suit, but in view of the lack of
clear federal authority grounded its decision to this effect on state
law.50 The Note of the Federal Advisory Committee is neutral on
this question.r1
Neither can this problem be answered with absolute assurance
by resort to principle. The purpose of compelling counterclaims
which are related to the principal claim is to reduce the volume of
litigation and promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of controversies by barring relitigation of the same set of
facts. This purpose can be achieved without applying the usual
penalties where the initial suit has been terminated without a deci-
sion on its merits, for in this situation, by hypothesis, there has not
yet been an actual determination of the facts and so an independent
suit would not involve retrial of the same old issues. This reasoning
would seem to indicate that the defendant who has failed to counter-
claim should not be barred where the first suit has been stillborn.
Nevertheless it would be a dangerous rule which would encourage
litigants to withhold their counterclaims in the hope that their
adversary's action might abort. The result of such a rule would be
a flood of applications for leave to file the omitted counterclaim by
those defendants who had miscalculated their opponent's inten-
tions; if the court leniently granted such applications, the counter-
claim would enter the case at an inconveniently late stage, when it
would be likely to delay the proceedings, while if the court should
be tough, defendant would have to pay the drastic penalty of losing
his unlitigated claim. Since there can rarely, if ever, be any good
justification for failure to plead the counterclaim at the outset of
47. Friedrichsen v. Cobb, 84 Mont. 238, 275 Pac. 267 (1929).
48. See note 34 supra.
49. See Douglas v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 81 F. Supp.
167, 170 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
50. Schott v. Colonial Baking Co., 111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
51. "If the action proceeds to judgment without the interposition of a
counterclaim as required by subdivision (a) of this rule, the counterclaim
is barred." This leaves the question as to when a suit has "proceeded tojudgment."
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the action, the sounder view would seem to be that any termination
of the first action without a counterclaim bars the counterclaim
forever. But this problem can arise only in terms of the defendant
who has failed to counterclaim and who subsequently seeks to
bring his own action. Res judicata has never been a popular de-
fense,52 and courts are likely to be moved to compassion for the
unfortunate claimant. If they do wish to strain the quality of mercy,
as rational a way as any would be to say that compulsory counter-
claim rules do not really involve res judicata at all, but turn instead
on notions of waiver or of estoppel, and that the first action was
ended before defendant had actually waived his claim.
The examples thus far considered have been of claims being
barred by virtue of the compulsory counterclaim rule. Indeed critics
of such a rule are accustomed to present it in terms of the deserv-
ing widow, a horde of hungry orphans clutching at her tattered
shawl, who is euchred out of her just claim against the scheming
banker because of her inexperienced lawyer's failure to plead a
compulsory counterclaim. The image lacks some elements of realism.
Considering the great number of jurisdictions which compel
counterclaims, it is remarkable that there have been so few cases
in which a party has actually been found to be barred because of
his failure to plead his claim as a counterclaim in a prior action. 3
The reason is obvious: jurisdictions which make some counter-
52. "The defense of res judicata is universally respected, but actually not
very well liked." Clark, J., dissenting in Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F. 2d
983, 988 (2d Cir. 1945).
53. The following are the only cases which have been found in a study
which has covered every case decided under compulsory counterclaim rules
modelled after the Federal Rule, or under the Arkansas statute, and most of
the important cases under statutes following the California model: Schott v.
Colonial Baking Co., 111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Shrieves v. Yar-
borough, 220 Ark. 256, 247 S. W. 2d 193 (1952) ; Corey v. The Mercantile
Ins. Co. of America, 207 Ark 284, 180 S. W. 2d 570 (1944) ; Brunswick Drug
Co. v. Springer, 55 Cal. App. 2d 444, 130 P. 2d 758 (1942) ; Newton v.
Mitchell, 42 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1949); Brinkmann v. Common School Dist.
No. 27, 255 S. W. 2d 770 (Mo. 1953); Keller v. Keldikian, 362 Mo. 919,
244 S. W. 2d 1001 (1951); Jocie Motor Lines, Inc. v. Johnson, 231 N. C.
367, 57 S. E. 2d 388 (1950) ; Friedrichsen v. Cobb, 84 Mont. 238, 275 Pac. 267
(1929) ; Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Mellen, 50 Utah 49, 165 Pac. 791 (1917).
In the following cases a bar was found, but only as to a small part of the
claim: Biaett v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 70 Ariz. 164, 217 P. 2d 923
1950) (counsel fees); Lewis v. Webb, 208 Ark. 1084, 189 S. W. 2d 376
1945) (item of $100 in controversy over title to real estate) ; Slim Olson,
Inc. v. Winegar, 246 P. 2d 608 (Utah 1952) (item of $11.60 in controversy
over much larger sum).
In the following three cases, though the bar is apparently grounded on
the compulsory counterclaim rule. in truth the party barred had lost the first
action and would be barred in any event by collateral estoppel: Snyder v.
Betsch, 59 Ariz. 535, 130 P. 2d 510 (1942); Morgan v. Rankin, 197 Ark.




claims compulsory almost invariably provide that any other counter-
claim, not compulsory, may be pleaded; thus the careful attorney
can and will plead all his client's claims as counterclaims if there
is any reason at all to think that they may be compulsory. By far
the great bulk of cases deciding whether a particular claim is com-
pulsory are cases in which the claim has actually been pleaded, and
the determination of whether it is compulsory is necessary only
because of the consequences that decision may have on questions
of jurisdiction,14 venue,55 jury trial,"' right to remove to another
court, 5 7 or appealability. s And there are, too, some cases in which
the counterclaim has not been pleaded but in which the question
arises on a motion to stay the independent action on what should
be a counterclaim ;5 in such cases it is not too late for the erring
54. The authoritative rule in the federal courts, which have a limitedjurisdiction, is that a compulsory counterclaim needs no independent grounds
for jurisdiction, whereas a permissive counterclaim must stand on its own feet
with regard to jurisdiction. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S.
593 (1926) ; 3 Moore, Federal Practice 113.15 (2d ed. 1948). It has, how-
ever, been argued recently, in quite a stimulating way, that even permissive
counterclaims require no indepen t jurisdictional grounds. Green, Federal
Jurisdiction over Counterclaims, 48 Nw. U. L. Rev. 271, 282-285 (1953).
55. Thus defendant may be held to have waived an improper venue by
filing a permissive counterclaim, though not by filing a compulsory counter-
claim. Cf. Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Thompson, 80 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Mo.
1948).
56. Those states which have held that a defendant waives trial by jury
by pleading a "legal" counterclaim in an "equitable" action, e.g., Behrens v.
Kruse, 121 Minn. 28, 140 N. W. 118 (1913), surely cannot apply that rule to
compulsory counterclaims, Lisle Mills, Inc. v. Arkay Infants Wear, Inc., 90
F. Supp. 676 (E.D. N.Y. 1950), though that precise question was left open in
Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 389, 229 P. 2d 945 (1951). In truth the original
rule of waiver was at variance with the general policy of code pleading and
should now be repudiated. Clark, Code Pleading 120-122 (2d ed. 1947);
5 Moore, Federal Practice f[ 38.14 (2d ed. 1951).
57. A defendant whose counterclaim in state court was compulsory
there has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court so as to waive
his right to remove to federal court. Lange v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 99 F.
Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1951) ; Wheatley v. Martin, 62 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Ark.
1945). Under some state practices an action in which a counterclaim is
inserted in excess of the jurisdiction of the court is to be transferred to a
court with jurisdiction if the counterclaim was compulsory but not if it was
permissive. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Walker, 151 FIa. 314, 9
So. 2d 361 (1942).
58. Under the original form of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), since changed by
amendment, the court could enter final judgment on plaintiff's claim, and an
immediate appeal could be taken, though a permissive counterclaim was still
pending, but could not do so if the counterclaim were compulsory. E.g.,
Nachtman v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 165 F. 2d 997 (3d Cir. 1948);
Parmalee v. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 157 F. 2d 582 (8th Cir. 1946).
59. E.g., Coates v. Ellis, 61 A. 2d 28 (D.C. Mun. App. 1948) ; Engle-
man v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. App. 754, 288 Pac. 723 (1930) ; Holmquist
v. Williams, 4th Dist. Minn., April 30, 1953, discussed 37 Minn. L. Rev. 638.
A writ of prohibition was granted to restrain an inferior court from trying
an action which should have been a compulsory counterclaim in another action
in State ex rel. Mack v. Scott, 235 S. W. 2d 106 (Mo. App. 1950).
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pleader to seek to have the suits consolidated 0 or to ask leave to
plead his claim as an omitted counterclaim. Federal Rule 13(f),
and its counterparts in the other modem pleading systems, give the
court authority to allow the pleading of a counterclaim which has
been omitted from the answer because of "oversight, inadvertence,
excusable neglect, or when justice requires" and this has been given
a liberal application. Only the defendant who has patently been
playing dog in the manger is likely to be denied leave to file his
counterclaim where the claim is compulsory. 61 It would even seem
to be possible, in a deserving case, to reopen the judgment, under
Federal Rule 60(b) and its equivalents in other modern pleading
jurisdictions, and thus allow pleading of the omitted compulsory
counterclaim though the first action has been terminated. 62
60. Though upon such a consolidation the action which should have
been pleaded as a counterclaim originally will be treated for all purposes as
a counterclaim. Dubler v. Gilbert, 10 F. R. D. 530 (S.D. N.Y. 1950); cf.
Parker Rust Proof Co. v. Detrex Corp., 14 F. R. D. 173 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
61. Courts generally have shown a proper liberality in allowing the
pleading of omitted counterclaims, and frequently the fact that the counter-
claim is compulsory has been regarded as reason enough by itself to allow
its pleading. Yankee Lines, Inc. v. Darling & Co., 13 Fed. Rules Serv.
13f.12, case 2 (N.D. Ohio 1950) ; Manhattan Fireproofing Co., Inc. v. Ver-
milya-Browxi, Inc., 13 Fed. Rules Serv. 13f.12, case 1 (S.D. N.Y. 1949)
(leave granted despite unexplained delay of one year) ; Gallahar v. George
A. Rheman Co., 50 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ga. 1943) ; cf. Smith Contracting Corp.
v. Trojan Construction Co., Inc., 192 F. 2d 234 (10th Cir. 1951) (leave should
have been granted though motion not made until trial had begun) ; Safeway
Trails, Inc. v. Allentown & Reading Transit Co., 185 F. 2d 918 (4th Cir.
1950) (leave properly granted where excuse was that defendant's lawyer had
never read Federal Rules!) ; Dazian's, Inc. v. Switzer Brothers, Inc., 14
F. R. D. 24 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Shepard, 13 F. R. D.
509 (S.D. N.Y. 1952) (leave granted to plead counterclaim omitted for 2 2
years through inexcusable neglect) ; 3 Moore, Federal Practice 13.33 (2d
ed. 1948).
Leave to file an omitted compulsory counterclaim was refused in Snyder
v. Betsch, 59 Ariz. 535, 130 P. 2d 510 (1942), where final judgment had
already been entered, and the counterclaim set up the substance of a defense
already held not good, and in Meyercheck v. Givens, 186 F. 2d 85 (7th Cir.
1950), where leave to file the counterclaim was asked as the court was drawing
judgment pursuant to a mandate from the appellate court, and defendant had
pending in the state court an action for the same grievance. And in the follow-
ing two cases the counterclaim not allowed to be pleaded was probably com-
pulsory, though the court does not say so: Brown-Vintners Co., Inc. v.
National Distillers Products Corp., 19 Fed. Rules Serv. 13f.12, case 1 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953), where the decision was based on the lack of factual support for
the counterclaim; and Newman v. Nursery Plastics, Inc., 15 Fed. Rules Serv.
13f.12, case 2 (S.D. N.Y. 1951). Finally there are two other cases in which
leave to file a counterclaim was denied, but in both these cases there is no
way to determine whether the counterclaim was compulsory or permissive,
and there were good reasons for refusing to allow its assertion: Shepherd v.
Wommack, 257 S. W. 2d 172 (Mo. App. 1953); Union National Bank of
Youngstown v. Universal-Cyclops Steel Corp., 103 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Pa.
1952).
62. There seems to be no definite authority on this point. The failure
of Keller to ask to have the judgment reopened so that he might plead his
counterclaim was counted against him by the Missouri Supreme Court in
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The nature of the bar against subsequent suit on the unpleaded
compulsory counterclaim is relevant, also, in answering a question
of great practical importance: does failure to plead a counterclaim
which is compulsory in the jurisdiction where the first suit is tried
prevent the pleader from bringing an independent action on his
claim in some other jurisdiction that does not recognize compulsory
counterclaims. At an Institute on the Federal Rules in 1938, this
question was put to the Reporter of the Committee which drafted
those Rules, Judge Charles E. Clark. His answer was:
"I don't suppose that we could govern that finally. I think the
answer would be that it should. I don't know what the legal
ruling is likely to be. I should think very likely a state court
would so rule, but I am not at all sure how it would work out.1
6 3
Doubt on this point was heightened when the first two state
courts to pass on the problem managed to find means of avoiding
the penalty and allowing the second suit, though neither court faced
up squarely to "the general question of the power of Federal courts
by rules for the regulation of their own practice to preclude a party
sued in a Federal court from resorting to a State court to estab-
lish his own claim."6 4 And an early federal decision had held, quite
properly, that the federal courts may not enjoin prosecution in the
state courts of a suit which would be barred in federal court. 65
If the compulsory counterclaim rules are mere rules of proce-
dure, then, according to well-understood principles of conflicts of
Keller v. Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S. W. 2d 1001 (1951). On the other
hand, a complaint asking, in part, that plaintiffs be relieved, under the Arizona
equivalent of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), from any penalty for failure to plead
a counterclaim in an earlier suit was held properly dismissed in Snyder v.
Betsch, 59 Ariz. 535, 130 P. 2d 510 (1942), though the decision can be ex-
plained, as in note 61 supra, on other grounds. But the language of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b) (1) lists as a ground for reopening a judgment the very same
factors of "inadvertence" and "excusable neglect" which are grounds, under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(f), for allowing an omitted counterclaim.
63. Proceedings of Cleveland Institute on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 248 (A.B.A. 1938).
64. Campbell v. Ashier, 320 Mass. 475, 480, 70 N. E. 2d 302, 305 (1946),
criticized 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 446 (1948) ; Detroit, T. & I. R. R v. Pitzer,
42 Ohio L. Abs. 494, 61 N. E. 2d 93 (19435. The tone of the Campbell case
implied that, if forced to it, the court would not enforce the federal counter-
claim rule, while in the Pit 7er case there is dicta that if a proper case were
before it, the court would refuse to entertain a suit by a party who should
have counterclaimed in federal courL Id. at 497, 61 N. E. 2d at 95. Perhaps it
is not mere coincidence that the distinction relied upon by the court in the
Campbell case to find the counterclaim not compulsory was unsound-com-
pare Morgan v. Rankin, 197 Ark. 119, 122 S. W. 2d 555 (1938), and dis-
cussion pp. 451-453 in!ra-while the reason the counterclaim in the Pitzer case
was found not compulsory is quite sound. Diggs v. Kansas City Southern
Ry., 207 Ark. 111, 179 S. W. 2d 860 (1944) ; and authorities cited note 106
infra.
65. Red Top Trucking Corp. v. Seaboard Freight Lines, Inc., 35 F.
Supp. 740 (S.D. N.Y. 1940).
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laws, they should have no extra-territorial effect. But if these rules
define the scope of the cause of action to which res judicata will
apply, or if they create a conclusive presumption of waiver against
the defendant who does not counterclaim, then such a defendant
should be barred no matter where he attempts to sue. The effect of
a judgment as res judicata is "substantive" and other jurisdictions,
under the full-faith-and-credit doctrine, must regard it as being as
broad and conclusive as it would be in the jurisdiction in which it
was rendered.6 So too, if a party waives a claim which he has, or
so conducts himself as to erect an estoppel against prosecution of
his claim, his waiver or the estoppel are personal to him and may
be asserted against him no matter where he sues.
These principles now have the weight of authority behind them,
for two later state court cases have held a claim barred for failure
to plead it as a counterclaim in a federal action." Can a neater
example be imagined of the impossibility of sensible distinctions
between "substance" and "procedure"? Compulsory counterclaim
provisions are enacted as a regulation of "procedure," and indeed
if, as in most jurisdictions, they have been made by rule of court,
they are valid only as a regulation of "procedure" which must leave
rights of "substance" unimpaired.6 8 Yet their effects are held to be
extra-territorial on the explicit ground that these effects are "sub-
stantive" !
We have examined now the mechanism by which a penalty is
exacted for failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim. It is next
necessary to see which counterclaims are compulsory.
66. Restatement, judgments § 47, comment c (1942) ; Failure to Plead
Federal Compulsory Counterclaim As Bar to State Suit, 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
446 (1948). For examples of this thesis, consult Schott v. Colonial Baking Co.,
111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953); A. B. C. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Kenemer,
247 Ala. 543, 25 So. 2d 511 (1946) ; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hathaway
Baking Co., 306 Mass. 428, 28 N. E. 2d 425 (1940); Mitchell v. Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank of Columbus, 165 S. C. 457, 164 S. E. 136 (1932).
67. Jocie Motor Lines, Inc. v. Johnson, 231 N. C. 367, 57 S. E. 2d 388
(1950) ; Conrad v. West, 98 Cal. App. 2d 116, 219 P. 2d 477 (1950). See also
the bewildering case of Grodsky v. Sipe, 30 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Ill. 1940),
where the court held that a claim could be sued on in federal court even
though it might have been the subject of a counterclaim in a prior Illinois
action. Such a result would be sound enough, but the case cannot be regarded
as authority for it, since the claim would not have been a counterclaim at
all, in Illinois or elsewhere, but only a cross-claim, and cross-claims are never
made compulsory by rule. This failure to distinguish between counterclaims
and cross-claims is not uncommon. Thus in Greenspan v. Green, 255 S. W.
2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) there is the remarkable pronouncement that
claims by one defendant tortfeasor against another for contribution are "per-
missive rather than compulsory counterclaims !"
68. E.g., 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 28 U. S. C. § 2072 (Supp. 1952) ; Minn.
Stat. § 480.051 (1953).
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WHICH COUNTERCLAIMS ARE COMPULSORY?
In Arkansas every claim that the defendants, or any of them,
have against the plaintiffs, or any of them, is a compulsory counter-
claim.°0 Thus Arkansas pleaders are faced with no hard decisions
in determining whether a particular claim must be pleaded. In the
other jurisdictions with compulsory counterclaim rules or statutes,
the problem is not so easy, for the class of counterclaims which are
compulsory is delimited by terms which have no fixed meaning. In
the modern pleading jurisdictions, except for Minnesota, a claim
is compulsory-subject to specific exceptions which need not con-
cern us-"if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."' 70 In Minnesota,
California, and Idaho those claims are compulsory which arise "out
of the transaction" that is the subject matter, or the foundation, of
the opposing party's claim,71 and Montana is not significantly dif-
erent.7 2 To determine, then, which counterclaims are compulsory,
it is necessary to know what is meant by the concept "transaction or
occurrence" or the concept "transaction."
"Transaction or occurrence"
Courts and commentators have, quite sensibly, refrained from
any very serious attempts at definition of the phrase "transaction
or occurrence." The wisdom of this course is evidenced by the
one pure definition which can be found:
"It seems apt to say that the words 'transaction' and 'occur-
rence' as used in Rule 13a include the facts and circumstances
out of which a cause of action may arise. * * * The words
'transaction' and 'occurrence' probably mean, whatever may be
done by one person which affects another's rights and out of
which a cause of action may arise."73
This definition is probably sound enough, but it shows the futility
of all definitions: after studying the definition we have no more
idea whether a particular counterclaim is compulsory than we had
before we started. Thus it is that most courts, rather than try to
define the terms of the rule, have preferred instead to suggest tests
by which the compulsory or permissive nature of a specific counter-
69. See p. 427 supra.
70. See pp. 424-425 supra.
71. See pp. 425-426 supra.
72. Though the Montana statute refers to "contract or transaction,"
note 20 supra, the broad reading given the word "transaction" by the Mon-
tana court has made other niceties of language of no importance. See Mason,
Counterclaim in Montana, 3 Mont. L. Rev. 33 (1942), and especially p. 62
thereof.




claim can be determined. Four such tests have been suggested by
different courts:
1. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute both
the plaintiff's claim and the counterclaim 71
2. Are the issues of fact and law on the claim and counterclaim
largely the same ?5
3. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on the defendant's
claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?76
4. Is there any logical relation between the plaintiff's claim and
the counterclaim ?7r
In each instance an affirmative answer to the question posed would
mean that the counterclaim is compulsory.
The second of these tests, identity of issues, is plainly unsound.
The defendant ought to be able to determine before answering
whether his claim must be pleaded as a counterclaim, yet no one
can know what the issues will be at best until after the plaintiff has
replied to the counterclaim, and more likely, not until the pre-trial
conference. And this test would require discarding many authorita-
tive decisions as wrongly decided; indeed in the leading case on
compulsory counterclaims, Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange7s
the issue on plaintiff's claim was whether defendants were violat-
ing the anti-trust laws by refusing to give him ticker service, while
the issue on the counterclaim was whether plaintiff was purloining
74. Ibid; Kuster Laboratories, Inc. v. Lee, 10 F. R. D. 350, 351 (N.D.
Cal. 1950) ; American Samac Corp. v. Florian, 9 F. R. D. 718, 719 (D. Conn.
1949) (alternative holding) ; cf. Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214,
227 (ND. Iowa 1952) (similar test for "transaction or occurrence" in cross-
claim rule).
75. See Nachtman v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 165 F. 2d 997, 999
(3d Cir. 1948).
76. "Everyone agrees, too, that, if a counterclaim is not 'compulsory,' it
is permissive and that the following is the acid test in distinguishing the two:
If a defendant fails to set up a 'compulsory' counterclaim, he cannot in a later
suit assert it against the plaintiff, since it is barred by res judicata; but if it
is 'permissive,' then it is not thus barred. To put it differently, if a counter-
claim is the kind not thus barred, it is 'permissive.'" Frank, J., dissenting in
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Industrial Corp., 154 F. 2d 814,
817 (2d Cir. 1946); Big Cola Corp. v. World Bottling Co., 134 F. 2d 718(6th Cir. 1943). This test was also used as an alternative ground for decision
in American Samac Corp. v. Florian, 9 F. R. D. 718, 719 (D. Conn. 1949).
It should be noted, more in sorrow than in anger, that a great court has
recently claimed to have found a counterclaim which is neither compulsory
nor permissive. Switzer Brothers, Inc. v. Locklin, 207 F. 2d 483, 487 (7th Cir.
1953). There ain't no such animal.
77. "If there be one compelling test of compulsoriness, it seems clearly
to be that of the logical relationship of all claims in any given litigation."
Rosenthal v. Fowler, 12 F. R. D. 388, 391 (S.D. N.Y. 1952). E.g., Moore v.
New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593, 610 (1926); Lesnik v. Public
Industrials Corp., 144 F. 2d 968, 975 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Douglas v. Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation, 81 F. Supp. 167, 170 (N.D. Ill. 1948) ; 3 Moore,
Federal Practice 1 13.13 (2d ed. 1948).
78. 270 U. S. 593 (1926).
[Vol. 38:423
ESTOPPEL BY RULE
quotations from defendant's exchange and using them for a "bucket
shop" operation. Yet the counterclaim was held to be compulsory.
Nor is the third test, that the counterclaim is compulsory if it
would be barred by res judicata absent the compulsory rule, an
apt one, even though when it was propounded it was said that
"everyone agrees" that it is "the acid test" in distinguishing com-
pulsory from permissive counterclaims." If this is "the acid test,"
then the compulsory counterclaim rules are not the important ad-
vance in judicial administration which their backers have supposed,
but are merely a declaration, for the convenience of the pleader, of
what has always been the rule. But the authoritative doctrine is that
a pleader is never barred from suing independently on a claim
which he refrained from pleading as a counterclaim in a prior
action.8 0 If this test is correct, then practically every decision which
has held a particular counterclaim to be compulsory is erroneous.
The first test, substantial identity of evidence, is appropriate
enough if it is used with caution. It is hard to imagine a case where
such an identity exists in which the counterclaim should not be
held to be compulsory; indeed the purpose of compelling counter-
claims, to prevent relitigation of the same set of facts, requires that
the counterclaim be held compulsory where it does turn on the
same evidence as plaintiff's claim. But the converse proposition is
not equally obvious. The authorities have been clear that a counter-
claim is compulsory where it arises from the same events as does
plaintiff's claim, even though the evidence needed to prove the
opposing claims may be greatly different. In the very simplest situ-
ation, a suit to void an insurance policy for fraud with a counter-
claim for the amount of the loss, the evidence of fraud is likely to
be entirely different from the evidence as to the loss and amount,
yet there can be no sound reason why two suits should be needed,
or permitted, to settle this one controversy between the parties.8,
Examples can easily be multiplied: in an action by one railroad
against another for an accounting on shipments from east to west
on which defendant was the settling carrier, a counterclaim for an
accounting on different shipments from west to east which passed
over defendant's lines ;2 in an action for earned freight, counter-
79. Note 76 supra.
80. Restatement, judgments § 58 (1942). That this doctrine is not every-
where accepted, see cases cited note 174 infra, and text thereto. And everyone
agrees that the independent action will be barred if the matter relied on for
the claim has been used defensively in the earlier action. Note 175 infra.
81. Such a counterclaim was held compulsory in Mercury Insurance Co.
v. Verea, 12 Fed. Rules Serv. 13a.11, case 2 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
82. As in Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Thompson. 80 F. Supp. 570 (E.D.
Mo. 1948).
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claims for cargo damage, demurrage, and expenses due to unsea-
worthiness of the vessel;83 in an action to compel issuance of a
patent, a counterclaim for an injunction restraining plaintiff from
exercising his rights under certain other patents in the same field
which he had obtained on the basis of confidential information pro-
cured from defendant ;84 in an action for damages for negligent in-
stallation of a piece of equipment, a counterclaim for the value of
certain parts used in the installation.8 5 All of these counterclaims
were held to be compulsory though they must be proved by evi-
dence different from that needed by plaintiff to prove his claim.
By this process of elimination we are left with the test original-
ly propounded by the United States Supreme Court and now cham-
pioned by Professor Moore. Subject to the specific exceptions of
the counterclaim rule,
"any claim that is logically related to another claim that is being
sued on is properly the basis for a compulsory counterclaim;
only claims that are unrelated or are related, but within the
exceptions, need not be pleaded.""6
The proposed test can be best understood by looking to the cases.
In an action for the proceeds of a note which defendant has collect-
ed for plaintiff, a counterclaim for an unpaid balance on the pur-
chase of some goods is not compulsory where, so far as appears,
the note had nothing to do with the goods.87 A counterclaim charg-
ing fraud, violence, and boycott in violation of the anti-trust laws is
not compulsory where the opposing party's claim is for damages
for the prior erroneous issue of an injunction, since vacated,
against it.8 In an action to declare a patent invalid and not in-
fringed, a counterclaim seeking transfer to defendant of a different
patent issued to plaintiff as transferee of the inventor is not
compulsory. 9 A counterclaim for taxes improperly collected in
1943 is not compulsory in an action to recover unpaid taxes for
1941 and 1942.90 In all of these cases it is probable that the claim
83. As in Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 159 F. 2d 349
(2d Cir. 1947).
84. As in Nachtman v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 165 F. 2d 997
(3d Cir. 1948).
85. As in Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar, 246 P. 2d 608 (Utah 1952).
86. 3 Moore, Federal Practice, ff 13.13 (2d ed. 1948).
87. Kaufman v. Cooper, 39 Mont. 146, 101 Pac. 969 (1909).
88. Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers
Union, 47 F. Supp. 67 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
89. Measurements Corp. v. Ferris Instrument Corp., 159 F. 2d 590
(3d Cir. 1947) ; cf. Clair v. Kastar, Inc., 138 F. 2d 828 (2d Cir. 1943).
90. Louisville Trust Co. v. Glenn, 66 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Ky. 1946). In
Robinson Bros. & Co. v. Tygart Steel Products Co., 9 F. R. D. 468 (W.D.
Pa. 1949), a vendee was suing for non-delivery of part of an order dated
Jan. 8th. A counterclaim for failure to pay part of an amount due on a sepa-
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and counterclaim were entirely unrelated, and that the decisions
that the counterclaims were not compulsory were sound. But if
there were any logical relationship of any kind, the opposite result
should have been reached.
It cannot, of course, be contended that the test of "logical rela-
tionship" here advocated will reconcile all the cases. Judges, like
other mortals, make mistakes-and they do so in matters of proce-
dure more often than elsewhere.91 But the very fewness of cases,
and these from inferior courts, where counterclaims which meet
the test of logical relation have been held not compulsory is itself
instructive . 2 Indeed the only really troublesome case is a United
States Supreme Court decision in which the Court interjected a
casual dictum that a claim for misuse of a patent in violation of
the anti-trust laws is only a permissive counterclaim in an action
for infringement of the patent.93 The Court could have reached the
same result quite simply, since the company now sought to be
barred had not been a party to the prior suit, and thus could not
possibly have run afoul of the compulsory counterclaim rule. 4 The
dictum is squarely opposed to an earlier holding by the Ninth Cir-
cuit,"' and the senselessness of saying that such a counterclaim is
only permissive has been persuasively set forth by a district judge
in a later decision, in which, however, he felt bound by what the
rate contract dated Jan. 26th was held not to be compulsory. The soundness
of this decision is not obvious, though on the scanty facts stated it is hard
to be sure.
91. This phenomenon is a result of what may be called "procedural par-
ticularism": "the resort to a rule of procedure, often subconsciously created
or inflated for the occasion, as a short cut to doing justice in a particular
case." Clark, Code Pleading 71 (2d ed. 1947).
92. Big Cola Corp. v. World Bottling Co., 134 F. 2d 718 (6th Cir. 1943),
held that in an action to declare a contract void, any claim which the de-
fendant might have had to recover on an implied contract for work done and
expenditures made was at most a permissive counterclaim. Moore comments
succinctly, "This holding is unsound." 3 Moore, Federal Practice t 13.13 n. 18
(2d ed. 1948). Unsound, also, are the holdings in: Kuster Laboratories, Inc.
v. Lee, 10 F. R. D. 350 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (counterclaim for breach of an
agreement permitting defendant to distribute plaintiff's products under plain-
tiff's label not compulsory in action for infringement of plaintiff's label);
Marks v. Spitz, 8 Fed. Rules Serv. 13.62, case 1 (D. Mass. 1945) (counter-
claim for damage to rented premises not compulsory in suit for overcharge of
rent); and Williams v. Robinson, 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 13a.11, case 1 (D.D.C.
1940) (counterclaim for libelous accusation that person was an adulterer not
compulsory in suit for divorce on grounds of adultery in which said person
was named as co-respondent). The result in the case last cited is justifiable,
note 104 infra, but the finding of more than one "transaction or occurrence"
is not.
93. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U. S.
661, 671 (1944).
94. See the acute criticism to this effect at 3 Moore, Federal Practice
13.12 n. 4 (1952 Cum. Supp.).




Supreme Court had said.96 Perhaps the only moral is that the
greater the judge, the less likely that he will trouble to answer cor-
rectly a question of "mere procedure. '9 7
Some may think, from the examples which have been discussed,
that the "logical relationship" test is too broad, and that it will
compel defendant to plead his counterclaims under circumstances
where two actions would be every bit as satisfactory. Probably it
will. But is there any harm in that? The judge has ample power
to order a separate trial if this seems the wiser course.98 In the
absence of any showing that a defendant is ever harmed by pleading
his claim-and it is my judgment that the literature contains no
96. Douglas v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 81 F. Supp.
167, 170 (N.D. Ill. 1948): "A consideration of the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim would appear to indicate certain inherent weaknesses in the
rationale of the Mercoid decision. A compulsory counterclaim, by definition,
is one that 'arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim.' In an action for patent infringement,
the subject matter is the patent, its use, and its infringement. And since it is
recognized as a valid affirmative defense, misuse by the patentee must also be
included as a necessary ingredient of the subject matter. It is logically related
to, and intimately interwoven with, the other elements so as to render it
indispensable to the whole. Nor does the mere fact that a separate right of
action is granted by statute for misuse by the patentee, alter its character.
* * * Although this court may not concur with the conclusion reached by
the Supreme Court, it is, nevertheless, bound by the rule declared therein. The
statement contained in the Mercoid case that 'The fact that it might have
been asserted as a counterclaim in the prior suit by reason of Rule 13(b) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure does not mean that the failure to do so renders
the prior judgment res judicata as respects it,' appears almost too casually
interjected; but its presence still results in the establishment of a rule of law.
Apparently, it was the intention of the Supreme Court to remove this
particular type of counterclaim from the dictates of Rule 13(a) in the
interest of public policy." Moore has pointed out that if the Mercoid case
had been correctly analyzed, the statement about the counterclaim would
have been seen to be a gratuitous dictum, and thus the case could have
been distinguished in the Douglas case, just quoted from, where the plaintiff
had in fact been a party to the prior suit. See note 94 supra and text thereto.
97. "A real difficulty with our subject is that it is thought beneath the
notice of those whose gaze is fixed on justice alone, but who nevertheless may
stumble without ever seeing the lowly obstruction at their feet." Clark, Code
Pleading 71 (2d ed. 1947). The classic example of a very great judge whose
procedural opinions were nonsensical is Justice Brandeis. E.g., Willing v.
Chicago Auditorium Assn., 277 U. S. 274 (1928), and-for the manner of
decision rather than the result-Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64 (1938).
98. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), Tex. R. Civ. P. 174(b), and equivalent rules
in other modem pleading jurisdictions. The holding in Ulmer v. Mackey,
242 S. W. 2d 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951, error ref'd) that the trial court
committed reversible error in granting a separate trial as to the counterclaim
may be corriect, since if, as is said by the reviewing court, the claim and
counterclaim turned on "identical facts and issues," the grant of a separate
trial might well have been an abuse of discretion. But the stated ground
for decision, that the trial court lacks power to grant separate trial as to a
compulsory counterclaim, reads a limitation into the rule on separate trials
which it does not contain and should not contain. That the trial court does
have such power was held, in an opinion which is a masterpiece of judicial
confusion, in Leon v. Noble, 234 S. W. 2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
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such showing-the sound policy is to require the pleading of de-
fendant's claims whenever there is any possibility that it may be
advantageous to have them tried with plaintiff's claim. Then the
determination of whether there should be separate trials can be
made shortly before trial, when it is possible to gauge more accu-
rately what issues are contested, rather than at the outset of the
action. And this determination will be made, too, by the judge,
who presumably is more likely than the defendant to ground his
decision entirely on considerations of sound judicial administration.
There are some judge-made exceptions to the broad scope of
compulsory counterclaims thus outlined. On grounds of a public
policy in having certain special types of proceedings decided swift-
ly, and without becoming ensnarled with counterclaims, various
courts have prohibited counterclaims in replevin actions,99 or in
actions under the Informers' Act,'00 or in forcible detainer ac-
tions." ' And there has been a variance of view as to whether a
counterclaim, otherwise compulsory, must be pleaded where it is a
type claim which is usually required to be asserted in an independ-
ent action.10 2 All such decisions as these add to the confusion of
99. Seven Seas Frozen Products, Inc. v. Fast Frozen Foods, Inc., 43So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1949), relying on a statute prohibiting the joining of replevin
or ejectment with any other action, though one would think the statutehad been repealed pro tanto by the all-inclusive language of the counter-
claim statute. A counterclaim was allowed in a replevin action in McCluskey
v. DeLong, 239 Mo. App. 1026, 198 S. W. 2d 673 (1946). Iowa has a statute
expressly prohibiting counterclaims in replevin actions, Iowa Code § 643.2(1950), and the court there has carried the statute to absurd lengths. Holo-
man v. Marsh, 116 Iowa 483, 94 N. W. 82 (1902). Whether the counterclaim
rule in Iowa has superseded the statute has not been decided; it should be
held that it has.
100. United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. Weekly Publications, Inc.,
74 F. Supp. 763 (S.D. N.Y. 1947).
101. Hinton v. Hotchkiss, 65 Ariz. 110, 174 P. 2d 749 (1946). This casedistinguishes Snyder v. Betsch, 59 Ariz. 535, 130 P. 2d 510 (1942), where
a statutory prohibition against counterclaims in possessory actions was held
superseded by the counterclaim rules, on the ground that that case, and the
similar case of Keystone Copper Mining Co. v. Miller, 63 Ariz. 544, 164
P. 2d 603 (1945), involved common law actions for the possession of land,
while forcible detainer is a purely statutory action. And the court said:
"To hold that the forcible entry and detainer statutes have been superseded
would preclude a speedy determination of a landlord's claim to possession."
Hinton v. Hotchkiss, mipra at 116, 174 P. 2d at 754.
102. Compare Jewish Consumptives Relief Society v. Rothfeld, 13 Fed.
Rules Serv. 13.211, case 1 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) (action to test title to office is a
special proceeding and may not be raised by counterclaim), with John R. Alley& Co. v. Federal National Bank of Shawnee, 124 F. 2d 995 (10th Cir. 1942)(counterclaim for usury proper though usury statute provides that right
granted thereunder must be asserted in an independent action). See also State
ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland, 357 Mo. 634, 210 S. W. 2d 31 (1948), holding that a
wife's claim for separate maintenance is a compulsory counterclaim in adivorce action, though this destroys wife's previous option merely to defend
against a divorce petition without pleading or forfeiting her right to separate
maintenance, and Stockman v. McKee, 6 Ter. 275, 71 A. 2d 876 (Del. Super.
1950), holding that compulsory counterclaims must be pleaded in mechanic's
1954]
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the lawyer in understanding an essentially simple rule. And they
would not be necessary if the courts would remember that the
counterclaim rule affects only the pleadings; whatever advantages
there may be in independent actions can be retained through the
power of the courts to order separate trials, and, if need be, to
enter a final judgment on the plaintiff's claim before proceeding to
consider the counterclaim. 0 3 Here, as elsewhere, it is dangerous
to push to the pleading stage a question which properly has to do
only with the method of trial if the action should be the rare one
which actually proceeds that far.
Another important exception to compulsion, not stated in the
rules, is that the defendant need not-and indeed may not-insert
a claim which is based on the wrongful act of the plaintiff in bring-
ing the instant suit. 10 ' This now seems so well settled in the cases
that it may be fruitless to express hesitation about its soundness.
It does seem that prohibiting counterclaims here will mean a second
trial of what are likely to be the very same facts, but perhaps the
dangerous potentialities of counterclaims for malicious prosecution
as a defensive strategem justify the rule. In any event the rule can
lien proceedings, but that permissive counterclaims may not be pleaded, as to
allow them would alter the substantial statutory right of not having inde-
pendent matters, on which a personal judgment might be based, entered in
mechanic's lien actions.
103. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and equivalent state rules. 3 Moore, Federal
Practice f 13.17 (2d ed. 1948).
104. Malicious prosecution: Park Bridge Corp. v. Elias, 3 F. R. D.
94 (S.D. N.Y. 1943); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Marbon Corp., 32 F.
Supp. 279 (D.Del. 1940); Zickel v. Knell, 357 Mo. 678, 210 S. W. 2d 59
(1948) ; cf. Union National Bank of Youngstown v. Universal-Cyclops Steel
Corp., 103 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Pa. 1952). Contra: Herendeen v. Ley Realty
Co., 75 N. Y. S. 2d 836 (Sup. Ct 1947), criticized Note, Counterclaim for
Malicious Prosecution in the Action Alleged to be Malicious, 58 Yale L. J.
490 (1949) ; cf. Carrier Corp. v. Sims Motor Transport Lines, Inc., 15 F. R. D.
142 (N.D. Ill. 1953). Wrongful sequestration: Capetillo v. Burress & Rodgers,
203 S. W. 2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). Malicious abuse of process: Bach v.
Quigan, 5 F. R. D. 34 (E.D. N.Y. 1945). But cf. Carrier Corp. v. Sims Motor
Transport Lines, Inc., 15 F. R. D. 142 (N.D. Ill. 1953). Libel in complaint:
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Coffelt, 11 F. R. D. 443 (S.D. Iowa
1951) ; Williams v. Robinson, 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 13a.11, case 1 (D.D.C. 1940).
A nice problem is posed by Iowa Code § 639.14 (1950), which provides
that one whose property has been maliciously attached "need not wait until
the principal suit is determined before suing on the bond" required for attach-
ment by § 639.11 of the Code. This statute would seem to mean that termina-
tion of the principal suit in favor of the owner of the property is not an
essential element of the cause of action against the bond. And a counter-
claim for wrongful attachment against the bond has been said to be proper
in Thielen v. Schechlinger, 210 Iowa 224, 230 N. W. 516 (1930), and Crom
v. Henderson, 188 Iowa 227, 175 N. W. 983 (1920). The argument that this
is only a contingent claim and thus runs afoul of the rule that only matured
claims can be counterclaimed, note 106 infra, is met on a verbal level by a
rationale that "[tihe terms of the bond are broken as soon as the wrongful
levy is made and the wrong done. Then the right of action is complete upon
the bond." Id. at 237, 175 N. W. at 987. Presumably, therefore, the counter-
claim against the bond is now compelled by Iowa R. Civ. P. 29.
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be explained either on the substantive ground that termination of
the first action is a necessary element of the cause of action for
malicious prosecution,' 05 or on the procedural ground that only
those claims which have matured may be pleaded as counter-
claims.110
"Transaction" alone
This extensive discussion has looked to the import of the phrase
"transaction or occurrence." What now of the simpler reference to
"transaction" alone which is to be found in the Minnesota Rules
as well as in the statutes of those states which have followed the
lead of California? Since the word "occurrence" presumably must
mean something, does its absence in the rules and statutes now to
be considered indicate that the scope of compulsion in those states
is less broad than in jurisdictions which have used both words?
The problem arises in this context. The Minnesota compulsory
counterclaim rule turns on "transaction."' 10 7 A famous Minnesota
case, construing an earlier statute which had spoken of "contract
or transaction," defined the word "transaction" in extremely broad
terms, and specifically as including both tort and contract.108 But
the apparent intent of the Minnesota Advisory Committee which
drafted the rules was to exclude tort claims from the compulsory
counterclaim rule.","' Usual canons of construction would, of course,
105. Restatement, Torts § 674(b) (1938).
106. That only matured claims may be pleaded as counterclaims is not
expressly stated in usual rules, but is to be implied from Fed. R. Civ. P.
13(e), and its equivalents in other modern pleading jurisdictions, which
creates a procedure by which a pleader may obtain leave to assert a counter-
claim which has matured after the filing of the pleader's original pleading. In
addition to the cases cited in note 104 supra, in many of which this has been
given as a ground of decision, the following cases have held that an un-
matured or contingent claim may not be asserted even as a permissive
counterclaim: Gold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co.,
190 F. 2d 217 (3d Cir. 1951); Cyclotherm Corp. v. Miller, 11 F. R. D. 88
(W.D. Pa. 1950); Diggs v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 207 Ark. 111,
179 S. W. 2d 860 (1944) ; Detroit T. & I. R. R. v. Pitzer, 42 Ohio L. Abs. 494,
61 N. E. 2d 93 (1943).
107. Minn. R. Civ. P. 13.01. See Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties
under Modern Pleading Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 580, 588-591 (1952).
108. "That causes of action in tort are included within the meaning of
this statute is quite obvious. The word 'transaction,' as there used, embraces
something more than contractual relations. It includes any occurrences or
affairs the result of which vests in a party the right to maintain an action,
whether the occurrences be in the nature of tort or otherwise." Mayberry v.
Northern Pacific Ry., 100 Minn. 79, 84, 110 N. W. 356, 358 (1907).
109. The Tentative Draft of the Minnesota Rules used the phrase
"transaction or occurrence" without limitation. Subsequently proposed Rule
13.01 was changed and the phrase "contract or transaction" substituted, with
a note implying, but not saying, that tort claims would thus be excluded.
7 Bench and Bar of Minnesota 18 (Sept. 1950). The Rule was adopted by the
court in this form. 232 Minn., Appendix p. 18. Less than a month before the
Minnesota Rules were to become effective, the court made an ex parte order
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say that when a court promulgates rules of procedure which use a
term that very court has previously defined quite carefully, the
court intended the term to be understood in the sense theretofore
given it. Such reasoning would lead one to conclude that tort
counterclaims are compulsory in Minnesota, and indeed that the
scope of compulsion in that state is probably just as great as under
the rules previously considered."0
A two-fold attack is made on this conclusion. First, lay dic-
tionaries are resorted to for the proposition that "transaction" in-
herently has reference to business negotiations. Second, by way of
application of the famous statement that "'Transaction' is a word
of flexible meaning,"' it is argued that while "transaction" may
well have a broad meaning when used in conjunction with "con-
"correcting" the Rules. One of these "corrections" struck "contract or" from
Rule 13.01, 233 Min. vii, leaving the simple word "transaction" as the test
of compulsoriness.
Even ignoring the touchy question of whether the intention of a com-
mittee which advises a court as to rulemaking is to be taken as the intent of
the court itself-see Commentary, 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 632 (1940), 3 id. 663(1940)-several difficulties suggest themselves in determining whether there
was ever any intent to exclude tort actions from the compulsory counterclaim
rule. First, the Chairman of the Minnesota Advisory Committee now tells us
that the notes commonly referred to as the Advisory Committee notes "were
prepared by the reporters for the information and guidance of the Committee
and are not necessarily to be taken as expressions of the views of the Com-
mittee." 1 Youngquist and Blacik, Minnesota Rules Practice vi (1953). Sec-
ond, when the court originally adopted the Rule, at which time it spoke of
"contract or transaction," it had in its hands a memorandum from the present
writer pointing out that the phrase in question had been defined by the court
in the Mayberry case, note 108 supra, as including tort claims. Is it not reason-
able, then, to suppose that the court intended to make tort claims compulsory,
and that the subsequent change from "contract or transaction" to "transac-
tion," described by the court itself as a mere "correction" was not intended to
produce a changed result? Third, if it be thought that the Committee or the
court suddenly realized that "contract or transaction" included tort claims,
and that the "correcting" change was made to exclude such claims, one would
have to contend that where "contract or transaction" includes contracts and
torts, the way to eliminate torts is to strike out "contract." This would be
a truly marvelous piece of dialectic. Compare Carroll, Through the Looking
Glass 120 (1920) : "'When I use a word,' -umpty Dumpty said, in a rather
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean- neither more nor
less.' 'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you cat make words mean so
many different things."'
110. The two Minnesota district courts that have passed on this question
have adopted the reasoning suggested, though in the case first cited the court
ventured an untenable dictum that a counterclaim for personal injuries might
require a different result than one for property damage. Holmquist v.
Williams, 4th Dist., Minn., April 30, 1953, approved 37 Minn. L. Rev. 638;
Bax v. Miller, 7th Dist, Minn., April 1, 1953. And there is a very suggestive
dictum from the Minnesota Supreme Court: "The present trend is to follow
procedures which will simplify litigation and avoid a multiplicity of suits,
particularly where actions arise out of one occurrence, accident, or transac-
tion, and to dispose of all questions, both of law and fact, in one suit for such
purpose. Rule 13.01." State ex el. Hierl v. District Court, 237 Minn. 456,
458, 54 N. W. 2d 5, 7 (1952) (emphasis supplied).
111. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593, 610 (1926).
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tract," it has a narrow meaning when it appears by itself in a set
of rules which in other places refer to "transaction or occur-
rence."112 The first argument is easily refuted. Though there have
been two cases--one of which was subsequently repudiated-hold-
ing that "transaction" refers to business or contractual matters, 113
most courts, including most pertinently the Minnesota court, have
held to the contrary. 114
The second argument may be answered both on authority and
by history. The authoritative answer is found in California decisions
construing that state's statutory scheme. California, it will be re-
called, distinguishes between counterclaims, which are compulsory,
and cross-complaints, which are not. Suppose defendant has a claim
for his injuries from the same collision for which plaintiff sues.
Defendant's claim clearly could be a cross-complaint, since it arises
from "the contract, transaction, matter, happening or accident upon
which the action is brought."" 5 But if it also might be asserted as
a counterclaim, then it is compulsory and defendant's failure to
plead it as such will bar a subsequent suit. A claim is a counter-
claim if it arises "out of the transaction set forth in the com-
plaint."" 0 Here is surely an even stronger case than in Minnesota
for holding that a collision is not a "transaction," since here "acci-
dent" is one of the terms used in conjunction with "transaction" to
describe non-compulsory claims. Yet the California courts have
been quite clear in going the other way, and in holding that an
automobile accident is a "transaction" within the meaning of the
compulsory counterclaim statute."'
The appeal to history proceeds in this vein: some writers and
judges have speculated that the draftsmen of the Federal Rules
must have had some purpose in adding "or occurrence" in their
112. 1 Youngquist and Blacik, Minnesota Rules Practice 428 (1953).
113. Commercial Credit Co. v. Peak, 195 Cal. 27, 231 Pac. 340 (1924);Hooven v. Meyer, 74 Ind. App. 9, 128 N. E. 614 (1920). The first case must
be considered overruled sub silentio by the cases cited note 117 infra. The
latter case actually says nothing on the point and may only be understood as
holding the point for which it is here cited by reference to a discussion 'of it
at 6 Cornell L. Q. 318 (1921).
114. See Pomeroy, Code Remedies § 650 *774 (5th ed. 1929) ; Wheaton,
A Study of the Statutes which contain the Term "Subject of the Action" and
Which Relate to Joinder of Actions and Plaintiffs and to Counterclaims, 18
Cornell L. Q. 20, 232, 242 (1932-1933).
115. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 442 (Deering 1949).
116. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 439 (Deering 1949).
117. "*** [I]t is established that all causes of action arising out of an
automobile accident are part of one 'transaction' within the meaning of the
code sections relating to cross-complaint and counterclaim." Schrader v.
Neville, 34 Cal. 2d 112, 114-115, 207 P. 2d 1057, 1058 (1949) ; accord, Engle-
man v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. App. 754, 288 Pac. 723 (1930) ; see Tod-hunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 693, 28 P. 2d 916, 918 (1934) ; Note, Counter-
claims, Cross-Complaints, and Confusion, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 99, 106 (1950).
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compulsory counterclaim rule, when previous rules of this sort had
spoken only of "transaction"; they suggest, therefore, the argu-
ment just considered, that "transaction" has particular application
to contract actions while "occurrence" has particular applicability
to tort actions."" If the federal rulemakers thought that they
were broadening the scope of compulsion by adding "or occur-
rence," then it is fair to conclude that state rules which reject "or
occurrence" in the compulsory counterclaim rule, while employing
the full phrase in other rules, are meant to limit compulsory coun-
terclaims to the less broad area covered by "transaction."
The actual history of the draftsmanship of Federal Rule 13(a)
is inconsistent with this line of argument. Though the details of this
history may be relegated to a footnote,1 9 its broad outlines are
118. Commentary, The "Compulsory" Counterclaim, 5 Fed. Rules Serv.
807, 808 (1942) ; see Sinkbeil v. Handler, 7 F. R. D. 92, 97 (D. Neb. 1946).
The dictum in the case last cited was relied on for a similar assertion in Keller
v. Keldildan, 362 Mo. 919, 927,244 S. W. 2d 1001, 1005 (1951), and Blackmar,
Some Problems Regarding Compulsory Counter-claims Under the Federal
Rules and the Missouri Code, 19 Kan. City L. Rev. 38, 47 (1950). The most
important claim that "transaction" is "more appropriate to describe a busi-
ness arrangement" is at Hiaasen, The Counterclaim Statute, 17 Fla. L. J.
215, 221-223 (1943), where it is attributed to a letter from the Hon. William
D. Mitchell, Chairman of the United States Supreme Court's Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules of Civil Procedure, in which Mr. Mitchell undertook to ex-
plain why "or occurrence" was added to Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). According to
the author's description of Mr. Mitchell's letter, the latter explained that he
did not have the materials on the formulation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) avail-
able, and was relying on his recollection five years or more after the event.
With much deference, I suggest that the actual history, detailed in note 119
infra, indicates that the factor suggested by Mr. Mitchell was not present in
the Committee's decision.
119. For this history I am indebted to the Reporter of the United States
Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, judge
Charles E. Clark, who has been good enough to go through the collection of
early documents on the history of the Federal Rules which are collected in the
Yale Law Library and to the Secretary of the Committee, Leland L. Tolman,
Esq., who has provided me with material from the files of the Committee. The
earliest form of what is now Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (a) was Rule 28 in the Tenta-
tive Draft of October 15, 1935, prepared by the Reporter. This rule provided
that the
"answer must state any counterclaim arising out of the [transaction which
.is] [acts or occurrences which are] the subject matter of the action or
else the claim is deemed waived."
The first alternative was patterned directly on the existing Equity Rule
30, while the second alternative was consistent with the Reporter's proposal,
in that draft, that the complaint should contain
"a short and [simple] [direct, etc.] statement of the acts [omissions] and
occurrences upon which the plaintiff bases his claim or claims for relief."
At its meeting of Nov. 14-20, 1935, the Committee chose the first alter-
native, "transaction which is," for the counterclaim rule, and also substituted
"is barred" for "deemed waived." This course was consistent with the Com-
mittee's decision not to use "acts and occurrences" as the criterion for the
complaint, and reflects also a natural reaction to accept the smooth working
equity rule, with the broad construction the Court had given that rule. Thus
in the transcript of the meeting it appears that the Reporter explained his
alternative proposals as follows: "I might say that one suggestion was that
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easily stated. The direct antecedent of Federal Rule 13(a) was old
Equity Rule 30, which made compulsory counterclaims arising out
of the "transaction." The Equity Rule had been authoritatively
construed as including all claims logically related, whether they
arose from tort or contract. 12 For reasons having nothing to do
with the supposed distinction between tort and contract, the joinder
of parties rule, which stems from a quite different historical back-
ground, was framed in terms of "transaction or occurrence.1 21 .
Since the word "transaction" is normally defined in terms of "oc-
we use both 'transactions' and 'occurrences.' I was not sure all of those things
added very much, and I put in the two alternatives. Where this requirement
of compulsory filing is adopted it is usual to have the term 'transaction.'"
Somewhat later Mr. Varren Olney summarized the trend of the discussion
by saying: "Gentlemen, we have the rule and a very broad construction put
upon it by the Supreme Court. Why change the rule under those circum-
stances?" So prodded the Committee voted unanimously to accept the Re-
porter's first alternative. In the form thus chosen the rule appeared as Rule
18 in the published Preliminary Draft of May, 1936.
Subsequently, at the meeting of Feb. 1-4, 1937, the Committee voted to
amend the rule on joinder of parties-now Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 (a) but then
referred to as Rule 27 (a) - to add the words "occurrence" and "occurrences"
substantially as now appears. The reasons for this change are discussed in
note 121 infra. After that meeting the Reporter prepared a draft, for circula-
tion among the Committee, embodying the changes made at the meeting. This
draft, under date of Feb. 20, 1937, had not only the change stated in the then
Rule 27(a), but also in Rule 18(a), the then counterclaim rule, the Reporter
inserted in brackets after the word "transaction" the words "or occurrence,"
together with this in the margin:
"Note: - Should not the bracketed words be added to conform to Rule
27 (a) ?"
At this time the Committee had determined to have no more meetings of
its full membership, but to refer questions of style to its Style Committee
which consisted of Judge Clark, Professor Edmund Morgan, and, as chair-
man, Senator George Wharton Pepper. On March 3, 1937, the Reporter wrote
the Style Committee, urging many changes of detail including the desirability
of conforming the language of the counterclaim rule to that used in the rule
on joinder of parties. The Style Committee met on April 12-17, 1937, and de-
cided to strike out the brackets in the counterclaim rule to produce such a con-
formity. The Style Committee's report was the basis for the published Pre-
liminary Draft of April, 1937, in which the rule, as thus cast, appears as Rule
13(a). It was in this form that the rule was finally adopted by the Supreme
Court.
120. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593 (1926).
121. The compulsory counterclaim rule is a lineal descendant of Federal
Equity Rule 30 and of American statutes going back to 1875. The joinder of
parties rule, Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a), on the other hand, is based on the English
rule governing that subject, as it was amended in 1896. Annual Practice 1953,
Order XVI, rule 1. This rule had worked smoothly in England. But its
adoption in 1920 in New York, in what was then N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§
209, 211, was not equally happy, for in the notorious case of Ader v. Blau, 241
N. Y. 7, 148 N. E. 771 (1925), the New York court managed to emasculate
the rule. One of the steps in the process of emasculation was a very narrow
construction of the concept "same transaction," albeit even this construction
admitted that tort claims arise from a "transaction." Thus it seems clear that
the purpose of the Federal Advisory Committee in adding "occurrence" to thejoinder of parties rule was to prevent the New York construction from being




currences,"'122 the Style Committee which put the Federal Rules
into final form felt free to conform the language of the compulsory
counterclaim rule to that of the joinder of parties rule. 23 But the
decision was treated as one of style, and there is no evidence in the
history of the rule that anyone supposed that "occurrence" had to
be added to Rule 13(a) in order to broaden that rule to include
tort claims.1 24 Thus the federal history confirms what the Cali-
fornia courts have held: counterclaim rules in terms of "transac-
tion" include all logically related claims, whether tort or contract,
even though other rules in the same jurisdiction talk of "trans-
action or occurrence."' 125
122. "'Transaction' is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a
series of many occurrences** *.' Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270
U. S. 593, 610 (1926). "The word 'transaction,' *** includes any occurrences
or affairs the result of which vests in a party the right to maintain an action,
whether the occurrences be in the nature of tort or otherwise." Mayberry v.
Northern Pacific Ry., 100 Minn. 79, 84, 110 N. W. 356, 358 (1907). "'Trans-
action' refers to any occurrence between two or more persons which may be-
come the foundation of an action." Wheaton, A Study of the Statutes which
contain the Term "Subject of the Action" and Which Relate to Joinder of
Actions and Plaintiffs and to Counterclaims, 18 Cornell L. Q. 20, 232, 242(1932-1933). In each case, of course, the italicization of "occurrence" is mine.
123. See note 119 supra.
124. "The use of the word 'occurrence' in the rule in connection with the
word 'transaction' can serve no other purpose than to make clear the meaning
of the word 'transaction.' An 'occurrence' is defined to be a happening; an in-
cident; or event. The word 'transaction' is somewhat broader in its scope than
the word 'occurrence.' The word 'transaction' commonly indicates an act of
transacting or conducting business but in the rule under consideration it is
not restricted to such sense. It is broad enough to include an occurrence."
Williams v. Robinson, 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 13a. 11, case 1 (D.D.C. 1940).
125. To take the opposite view, as urged by those who advocate a limited
construction of the Minnesota rule, would pose new problems. The rules on
relation back of amendments, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.03,
and the similar rules in other jurisdictions, say that an amendment relates back
if it arises out of "the conduct, transaction, or occurrence" set forth in the
original pleading. If "transaction" means less, standing by itself, than it does
when used in conjunction with "occurrence," then rules which speak in one
place of "transaction or occurrence" and elsewhere of "conduct, transaction
or occurrence" must be construed so that the former rule has a narrower scope
than the latter. But no one has ever suggested such a result, nor, quite wisely,
has anyone ever attempted to say when a claim arises out of the "conduct"
relied on in another claim but not out of the "transaction or occurrence."
Again the rules on supplemental pleadings, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (d), Minn. R.
Civ. P. 15.04, speak of "transactions or occurrences or events". What "events"
are not "conduct'? What "events" are not "transactions or occurrences"?
Compare 1 Youngquist and Blacik, Minnesota Rules Practice 428 (1953) :
"It is difficult to imagine a claim the subject of which is neither a 'transaction'
nor an 'occurvence'."
The real reason for the reference to "conduct" in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (c)
and to "events" in Rule 15 (d) is that the rulemakers were excessively
cautious and wished to give the courts no possible loophole through which to
reach a harsh result on the specific problems covered by those specific rules.
This is exactly the same reason that "occurrence" was added to the joinder
of parties rule, see note 121 supra, and the addition should be of no more
significance in the one case than in the other.
To recapitulate, the Minnesota Rules speak variously of: "transaction".
Rules 13.01, 13.02; "transaction or occurrence", Rules 13.07, 14.01, 20.01:
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The last problem to be considered in deciding which counter-
claims are compulsory is one which arises under both types of
compulsory counterclaim rules, as indeed is to be expected in
view of the conclusion just reached that rules and statutes which
speak only of "transaction" have precisely the same scope as those
which refer to "transaction or occurrence." This problem is that
posed by persons who may be involved in an event in more than
one capacity. If a defendant is sued in one capacity, must he plead
a claim which he has in another capacity? Or if plaintiff sues in one
capacity, is the defendant required to assert as a counterclaim a
claim, otherwise compulsory, which he has against the plaintiff in
a different capacity?
The cases are hopelessly at odds. On the one hand it has been
held that in a suit by members of a partnership upon an obligation
owed the firm, defendant is required to assert such claims as he
may have against the individual plaintiffs arising from the transac-
tion sued upon. 12 And where an insurer sues as subrogee of the
rights of its insured, defendant has been required to plead any
counterclaims he may have against the insured. 2 7 On the other
hand, it has been decided that in an action brought by plaintiffs as
trustees, counterclaims against the plaintiffs as individuals are not
only not required, but are not permissible.12 Again a city tax offi-
cial has not even been allowed to counterclaim on behalf of the
city for the recovery of taxes in an action against the official in his
personal capacity for violation of the Civil Rights Act.129
The most important instance of the problem of capacities has to
do with collisions that result in the death of one or both parties. In
a suit against an administrator for negligence of his intestate, must
the administrator counterclaim for wrongful death? Arkansas says
"Yes"; Massachusetts says "No.' 30 The Massachusetts reasoning
"conduct, transaction, or occurrence", Rule 15.03; and "transactions or occur-
rences or events", Rule 15.04. No one has ever suggested that these four
different phrases have four different meanings; indeed it seems agreed that
the last three all mean exactly the same thing. To hold that the first phrase
differs from the last three in meaning merely because it differs from the sec-
ond phrase in form cannot be justified by logic, and, as has been shown, it is
flatly refuted by history and previous judicial construction.
126. Abraham v. Selig, 29 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), approved 7
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 394 (1940).
127. General Cas. Co. of America v. Fedoff, 11 F. R. D. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
128. Chambers v. Cameron, 29 F. Supp. 742 (N.D.Ill. 1939). Cf.
Cravatts v. Klozo Fastener Corp., 15 F. R. D. 12 (S.D. N.Y. 1953) (corporate
defendant in stockholder's suit may not counterclaim against plaintiff in his
individual capacity).
129. Durham v. Bunn, 85 F. Supp. 530 (E.D.Pa. 1949).
130. Compare Morgan v. Rankin, 197 Ark. 119, 122 S. W. 2d 555 (1938),
with Campbell v. Ashler, 320 Mass. 475, 70 N. E. 2d 302 (1946).
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is that the administrator is sued in his capacity as the representative
of the estate for the benefit of creditors, while he sues on the wrong-
ful death claim for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries of such
a claim. All this is true, and can easily be taken care of in shaping
the form of the judgment. But to reason from this to the conclu-
sion that the administrator when sued is not the same person as
the administrator when prosecuting a wrongful death claim, and to
close with ringing declarations against "depriving of his cause of
action a person who was never a party to litigation"'13 is, in the
words of a commentator, "to pursue a legal fiction to an absurd
extreme.'
13 2
A more realistic approach was demonstrated by the Florida
court. Mitchell's employee, Hardin, was killed in a collision with
Newton. Mitchell, suing as assignee under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act of Mrs. Hardin's claim for her husband's death, re-
covered a judgment against Newton. Subsequently Newton sued
Mitchell, claiming that Newton's injuries in the collision were
produced by the negligence of Mitchell's employee. The court held
that this claim was barred by failure to assert it as a counterclaim
in the first suit.
"True, their capacities as plaintiffs on the one hand and de-
fendants on the other would not have been the same, but from
a practical standpoint we do not see where any insuperable
difficulty would have been met had Newton's claim been pre-
sented in a cross action. * * * Had the Mitchells lost, they
would have paid Newton; had they won, they would have reim-
bursed themselves, * * * and paid the remainder of the recovery
to the representative of the person entitled to the money. * * *
After all, the fundamental issue was the one of negligence, and
there could be no complication, or confusion even, from the fact
that certain persons on the one hand were suing instead of
Hardin's widow and on the other hand were defending as
Hardin's employer.' 11 33
This sensible and practical approach is that which should be
taken to the problem of capacities. Usually the different capacities
will not be confusing to the jury and requiring the counterclaim
will permit disposition by one trial of claims which would other-
wise take two trials. Thus the counterclaims should be required,
with the court free to order separate trials or separate judgments
in the exceptional case which calls for such a procedure. 34 The
131. Id. at 481, 70 N. E. 2d at 305.
132. 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 446, 447 (1948).
133. Newton v. Mitchell, 42 So. 2d 53, 54-55 (Fla. 1949), approved 4
Miami L. Q. 251 (1950).
134. This is the general approach urged at 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 394(1940).
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alternative will be that a legal fiction may permit inconsistent judg-
ments on the same facts,135 since if the capacities are said to be so
different that the compulsory counterclaim rule does not apply,
it is to be expected that the doctrines of res judicata and of col-
lateral estoppel will be held equally inapplicable. Perhaps it goes
too far to say that differing capacities should never take a claim
out of the area of compulsion,' 36 since the differing capacities may
cause problems of jurisdiction, venue, and service of process. But
where these difficulties are not present, it should be held that
defendant is required to assert all the claims which he has against
the plaintiff in any capacity.
We have now completed our examination of compulsory coun-
terclaims. We know which claims are compulsory, and we have
seen, by study of the actual cases as well as by excursions into legal
theory, how the compulsion is brought to bear on the reluctant
pleader. We are'now prepared to weigh intelligently the criticisms
which some commentators have directed at the device of the com-
pulsory counterclaim.
EVALUATING THE DESIRABILITY OF COMPELLING COUNTERCLAIMS
It will surprise no one to learn that the critics of compulsory
counterclaims may be divided into two classes: (1) those who
think the typical rules do not go far enough; and (2) those who
think such rules go too far.
Principal exponent of the position that the rules do not go far
enough is a Missouri lawyer and teacher who argues as follows:
"On the basis of the decisions discussed above, it may be con-
cluded that the language of Rule 13(a) leaves much to be de-
sired and does not reflect very well the policy which is desired
to be accomplished. The term 'transaction' can be given a broad
meaning but in numerous instances a claim closely related to
the plaintiff's claim may exist without arising out of the same
transaction, and without the presence of anything which could
properly be called an occurrence. * * * In further opinions con-
struing the scope of Rule 13(a) the courts should probably
take the language of the Rule as a guidepost rather than as a
rigid standard and should seek to compel the adjudication to-
gether of claims bearing a close and substantial relationship to
each other. Perhaps the purpose of the Rule could be more
nearly accomplished if it were amended to require the pleading
135. As in Moss v. Taylor, 73 Utah 277, 273 Pac. 515 (1928), where the
court held that a party need not counterclaim a claim which he has previously
assigned, nor is his assignee bound by the determination of the first suit against
his assignor.
136. As is contended at 4 Miami L. Q. 251, 252 (1950).
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of all counterclaims arising out of the subject matter of the
opposing claim, without speaking of transactions or occurrences.
Already some courts have practically construed the rule in this
manner."
3 7
This argument would cause concern if the facts supported it.
They do not. Where are the "numerous instances" of closely re-
lated claims which have been held not to arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence? The present study has covered every
case decided under the compulsory counterclaim rules of the Fed-
eral courts and of the fourteen other jurisdictions with rules
modelled on the Federal. It has covered as well every case decided
under the Arkansas statute, and a substantial sampling of the
cases from California, Montana, and Idaho. On the basis of such
a study it was concluded that "the very fewness of cases, and these
from inferior courts, where counterclaims which meet the test of
logical relation have been held not compulsory is itself instruc-
tive. '138 I consider this quite a striking showing that the courts
generally-not merely "some courts"--have been construing the
rule in the very sound fashion urged by the Missouri critic.
Perhaps a criticism is implied in the Arkansas statute which
requires all counterclaims to be pleaded, whether they are related
to plaintiff's claim or not.1 39 Professor Moore has undertaken to
answer such a position by saying that this might complicate the
pleadings where a party has many such claims, and would force
defendant to submit claims to the forum of his opponent's choosing
which he might prefer to litigate elsewhere. Further, he says, de-
fendant may be in doubt as to the existence or advisability of liti-
gating certain claims at the time suit is brought. For these reasons
Moore concludes that defendant should be allowed to use his own
judgment as to whether unrelated claims should be pleaded.140 The
objection may be urged that all of these arguments are equally ap-
plicable to the class of counterclaims which now are made com-
pulsory. And so they are. But in the case of counterclaims arising
from the "same transaction or occurrence," the public interest in
having only one lawsuit to settle an entire controversy outweighs
the difficulties noted by Professor Moore. Extension of the class
of counterclaims which is to be compulsory would carry with it
these same difficulties but would offer no countervailing benefits.
137. Blackmar, supra note 118, at 51-52.
138. P. 441 supra.
139. P. 427 supra.
140. 3 Moore, Federal Practice 1 13.12 (2d ed. 1948). And see Millar,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 138: "Certainly a rule of compulsion extended to every
allowable counterclaim cannot be regarded as defensible."
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By hypothesis the counterclaims which are compulsory in Arkansas
and not compulsory elsewhere are entirely independent of the
claims of the opposing party. There is, then, no improvement in
judicial administration by requiring the claim and the counterclaim
to be tried at the same time. I am bound to say that I see no harm
in thus extending the scope of compulsion, and feel that the
Arkansas rule may have the advantage of simplicity. But the choice
between compulsion in every case and compulsion in most cases is
not presently a problem of practical importance.
Several of the criticisms which claim that even the usual type
of compulsory counterclaim rule goes too far are easily dealt with.
An early commentator on the Federal Rules bewailed the fact that
"the mandatory provision, subject to court discretion, forces
an individual to sacrifice his own judgment as to the desira-
bility of pleading a certain claim and to accept the judgment of
the trial court."' 1
That is exactly what it does, and exactly what it is intended to do.
The day has long since passed in civil procedure when litigation
was thought of as a game in which each side was free to adopt
whatever strategem it deemed to its advantage, while the judge
was expected to sit like a benign Buddha, calling a penalty only
for the most flagrant gouging, kneeing, or biting. Today it is well
recognized that there is an important public interest in efficient con-
duct of the courts, and in adjudications on the merits rather than
on the cleverness of counsel. Compulsory counterclaim rules are
an attempt to implement this public interest.
Closely connected with the criticism just considered is the fan-
tastic argument that compulsory counterclaim rules discriminate
against defendants, since they require defendants to plead all their
claims arising from the transaction sued upon, while plaintiffs are
free to choose which of their claims arising from that transaction
they will join. 4 2 A first answer to this, as student writers have
noted, is that even if plaintiffs are sometimes able to protract liti-
gation, it hardly follows that we must therefore allow defendants
to do So.-3 A better answer is that the criticism is based on a
premise which is largely false. It is true that we have not yet fol-
lowed the advice of judges and professors that plaintiffs should be
141. Legislation, Recent Trends in Joinder of Parties, Causes, and
Counterclaims, 37 Col. L. Rev. 462, 463 n. 8 (1937). See also Millar, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 137-138, where the "liberty of assertion" is described in such
ponderous terms as to make one think it must be protected by the Bill of
Rights, or at least mentioned in Magna Charta.
142. E.g. Scott, supra note 36, at 26; Blackmar, supra note 118, at 42.
143. Developments in the Law-Res .udicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818,
832 (1952).
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compelled by rule to join all of their claims. 4 4 Perhaps one of the
reasons that no such rules have been enacted is that they are un-
necessary, that essentially this result has already been achieved by
the operation of established doctrines.
The particular manifestation of res judicata which goes under
the name of "splitting a cause of action" requires that a plaintiff
must get in one lawsuit all the relief he is entitled to from one
cause of action, for the doctrine of merger will prevent him from
bringing a second suit on the same cause. The plaintiff has a choice
whether or not to join claims arising from one transaction or oc-
currence only if it can be said that he has more than one cause of
action. Probably a single transaction or occurrence could have
given rise to more than one cause of action by the older theories
of Pomeroy, McCaskill, and Gavit. 45 But these theories are now of
interest only to antiquarians. Today it is commonly accepted that a
"cause of action" is that aggregate of operative facts which may
conveniently be dealt with in one lawsuit.146 Since the whole notion
of compelling counterclaims rests on a belief that trial convenience
and judicial economy will be served by treating at one time the
claims of both parties which arise out of the one transaction, it can
hardly be contended that the group of opqrative facts which can
conveniently be treated at one time, and which constitute therefore
a single cause of action, is less than all the facts which make up the
transaction or occurrence. By this reasoning plaintiffs must usually,
if not invariably, join all their claims arising from the one transac-
tion or be barred from subsequent suit just as much as defendants
must. Thus analyzed, the supposed discrimination against defend-
ants is seen to be non-existent.
Still another criticism comes from the pen of one of the most
productive and able scholars working in the field of procedure:
"Certainly a rule of compulsion extended to every allowable
counterclaim cannot be regarded as defensible. If a compulsory
rule is ever justifiable it is only when the counterclaim operates
by way of defense to the principal claim. Just as a defendant
may not with impunity withhold a defense, so we may without
violence to the traditional maxim deny him the right to with-
hold a counterclaim if this in whole or part is of a defensive
nature. This would appear to indicate the proper line of divi-
144. Hyde, J., in Chamberlain v. Mo.-Ark. Coach Lines, Inc., 354 Mo.
461, 467, 189 S. W. 2d 538, 540 (1945) ; Blume, Required Joinder of Claims,
45 Mich. L. Rev. 797, 812 (1947) ; Note, Joinder of Actions, 40 Ky. L. J. 105,
112 (1951)
145. As to which see Clark, Code Pleading 129-136 (2d ed. 1947).
146. Id. at 137-146. E.g., United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288
U. S. 62 (1933) ; Elliott v. Mosgrove, 162 Ore. 540, 93 P. 2d 1070 (1939).
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sion between compulsory and permissive counterclaims. But it
is not the line of division adopted by the Federal Rules under
which the distinction is between counterdemands which arise
out of 'the transaction or occurrence' on which the plaintiff rests
his claim and those which do not. Suppose on the one hand, the
ordinary case of set-off: B, let us say, is indebted to A in the
sum of $500 upon a promissory note, and A is indebted to B in
the sum of $1000 for goods sold and delivered. One would
imagine that if we are to have a compulsory rule this would be
the very case to which it would be appropriate, for recovery by
B would here as part of its effect wholly cancel A's claim. Yet
under such a rule as the federal one, B would be perfectly free
to reserve his counterdemand for a separate action. Suppose,
on the other hand, that A and B have engaged in the exchange
of properties, each giving to the other as part of the transaction,
a mortgage on the property conveyed to the mortgagor, and that
in each case the mortgaged property is so ample a security for
the mortgage indebtedness that no question of a deficiency will
arise. Suppose, further, that after the maturity of both mort-
gages, each remaining unpaid, A sues to foreclose the mortgage
executed by B on property X, not asking for any personal judg-
ment against B. Under the principle thus accepted by the Fed-
eral Rule, B would be compelled, through the medium of a
counterclaim, to seek foreclosure of the mortgage executed by
A on property Y, although he might have excellent reasons for
not wanting to do so until a later time, and simply because both
claims, affecting entirely different pieces of property arose
out of the same transaction. Clearly, then, there should be no
compulsion where the two claims thus aim at unconnected
relief." 1.
7
Rarely has an argument marched so inexorably from false
premise to unsound conclusion. This whole house of cards is stacked
on the proposition that only those counterclaims should be com-
pulsory which are defensive in whole or in part. Why? If counter-
claims are to be compelled at all, it must be because some public
purpose is served thereby. The compulsory counterclaim rule was
not promulgated to save litigants from their own stupidity. A coun-
terclaim may be of a defensive nature, and yet be completely un-
related to plaintiff's claim. In such a case it will probably be to
defendant's advantage to plead it, and thus avoid the risk that
plaintiff will get a judgment on his claim, squander the proceeds in
riotous living, and go bankrupt before defendant gets around to
prosecuting his own claim. But if the claims are unrelated, there
is no gain to the public in having them brought in one action, and
no reason, therefore, for the public to take the extraordinary step of
requiring defendant to plead his claim in the first suit .The example
147. Millar, op. cit. .rpra note 1, at 138-139.
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given in the quoted passage of what the learned author calls "the
very case" to which a compulsory rule is appropriate, demonstrates
this. There is no economy of litigation in requiring B to assert his
claim for goods sold and delivered in an unrelated action by A on a
promissory note. This can be regarded as an appropriate case for
compulsion only by reasoning from the faulty premise that those
claims which are defensive should be compelled.
It is not true that all defensive claims should be compelled. Nor
is it true that only defensive claims should be compelled, or, as
otherwise stated, that there should be no compulsion where the
two claims aim at unconnected relief. We can revert again to the
classic case of Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange."'18 There, it
will be remembered, plaintiff's claim was that defendants' refusal
to furnish ticker service from the exchange was a violation of the
anti-trust laws, while the counterclaim sought to enjoin the use of
purloined quotations in a "bucket shop" operation. The relief sought
is unconnected, and defendants' claim, far from being defensive, is
a rather powerful counterattack. Yet here is a case where requiring
the counterclaim means that one suit will dispose of matters which
otherwise might be presented in two suits. Relitigation of the same
facts is prevented by requiring the counterclaim, and an important
public interest thus protected. Other examples can be easily imag-
ined: in an action to declare a contract void, a counterclaim for the
reasonable value of work done ;149 in an action to replevy a chattel,
a counterclaim for repairs or improvements made to the chattel.1 0
If counterclaims are to be compelled when it is in the public inter-
est to do so, these counterclaims must be compelled, though they
would not be if the view of the critical author were to prevail. I shed
no tears for the hypothetical B who is compelled to foreclose a
mortgage he doesn't want to foreclose. This kind of imaginary
horrible has never come up in the cases.
Negligence Cases
The last criticism of compulsory counterclaim rules which must
be studied is perhaps the weightiest of all, for it is urged by the dis-
tinguished Advisory Committee which drafted the Minnesota
Rules. Further there is at least an implication that it represents a
view shared by the rulemakers in New Jersey, whose labors in
148. 270 U. S. 593 (1926).
149. As was indicated in note 92 supra, the holding in one case that such
a counterclaim is not compulsory was unsound.
150. That such a counterclaim would not be compulsory if there were
a requirement that compulsory counterclaims must tend to diminish or defeat
plaintiff's recovery, see Clark, Code Pleading 651 (2d ed. 1947).
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bringing that state out of the depths of procedural reaction have
won them so much acclaim. The argument is, quite simply, that
counterclaims should not be compelled in tort cases, or, since this
is what these critics really have in mind, in negligence cases. We
have earlier studied the contention that tort claims are not com-
pulsory in Minnesota, and found it to be unsound. 51 The inquiry
now is directed at the quite different question, is it desirable to
compel counterclaims in negligence cases.
We turn first to the authorities-since we are accustomed to
look to them to see what is the law, it is natural to ascertain their
views as to what should be the law. The Supreme Courts of Florida
and of Arkansas have had occasion to comment on this question
in the course of opinions holding that counterclaims in accident
litigation must be pleaded:
"In arriving at this conclusion we are not uninfluenced by the
knowledge of the vast amount of litigation now appearing in the
courts growing out of the collisions of motor vehicles and the
great importance of determining such controversies as speedily,
economically, and accurately as possible. The circuit judge's
decision that Newton should not be allowed to present his claim
independently harmonizes with our view that application of the
statute in this fashion will ultimately benefit litigant and
court."'
S 2
"If one participant in an automobile collision may, when sued
by the other, waive the right to assert his own damages as a
result of the collision and later sue for such damages in a
separate suit we may reasonably expect two suits in many of
such cases, and a more prolific and profitable field of litigation
will be opened up than existed in the case of suits by guests
against their hosts, before the passage of our guest statute on
that subject."' 5 3
These statements merely emphasize what should be obvious
from the outset: since accident cases make up the bulk of litigation
today, there would be precious little purpose in a compulsory
counterclaim rule which did not have such cases within its orbit.
Two arguments are advanced by the Minnesota rulemakers
against compelling counterclaims in accident cases.5 4 It is said,
first, that often the defendant will not know that his injuries are
151. Pp. 445-450 supra.
152. Newton v. Mitchell, 42 So. 2d 53, 55 (Fla. 1949).
153. Morgan v. Rankin, 197 Ark. 119, 124, 122 S. W. 2d 555, 558 (1938).
154. 7 Bench and Bar of Minnesota 18 (Sept. 1950). It should be noted
that the Court Rules Committee of the Minnesota State Bar Association has
recently determined that the arguments against compelling counterclaims in
tort cases are unsound, and has unanimously recommended that the words "or
occurrence" be restored to Minn. R. Civ. P. 13.01 in order to eliminate any
doubt on this point.
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sufficiently grievous to justify a claim at the time suit is brought
against him. Surely this must be only a makeweight argument, for
congested court calendars in Minnesota, as elsewhere, give the
injuries ample time to develop before final judgment, and this is
exactly the kind of case in which leave to file an omitted counter-
claim would be granted as a matter of course. The second argument
is more serious. It is that defendant will usually be represented by
an insurance company lawyer who will have no interest in prosecut-
ing the counterclaim. The case thought to justify this dire predic-
tion is Keller v. Keklikian, the Missouri case discussed earlier,'G in
which the insurer settled plaintiff's claim and had a judgment of
dismissal entered before the defendant had an opportunity to assert
his counterclaim. There, it is true, the defendant was held barred
from later action, though the court pointed out various procedures
by which the harsh result could have been avoided had defendant
availed himself of them, and it threw out a broad hint that he might
still have a remedy against his insurer.156
Keller v. Keklikian is the only case in which a compulsory coun-
terclaim rule has led to a harsh result in an accident situation. The
rule is applied, as a matter of course, to collision cases every day
without, so far as appears, any difficulty.15 7 Yet the kind of prob-
lem which did arise in the Keller case comes up just as much in
states without compulsory counterclaim provisions.
A recent Ohio decision concerned a defendant who had actual-
ly counterclaimed in a collision case. The jury found for plaintiff
on the claim and counterclaim. The insurer promptly satisfied the
judgment, the insurer's attorney withdrew, and defendant's lawyer
got the satisfaction of judgment amended to show that it had been
made by the insurer without the consent of the defendant, after
which defendant appealed. An intermediate appellate court found
that there had, in fact, been errors of law, and that defendant was
entitled to a new trial. But the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the
order for a new trial, saying that when the insurer had paid the
judgment against defendant on plaintiff's claim it established for
all time that defendant had been negligent and plaintiff had been
155. Pp. 429-432 supra.
156. "This is not to be understood as delimiting the rights, duties or
actions of an assured and his liability insurance carrier under the terms of
their policy * * *." 362 Mo. 919, 925, 244 S. W. 2d 1001, 1004 (1951).
157. I have found twelve reported cases in which a counterclaim was
held compulsory in a collision case, without any difficulty appearing except in
Keller v. Keklikian. I do not think it worthwhile to set out the citations of
these cases. In sum they vindicate the claim of a commentator that application
of the compulsory rule to automobile cases should cause "little difficulty."
Blackmar, mepra note 118, at 47.
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free from negligence, and thus that defendant was estopped by the
action of his insurer from getting the new trial on his counterclaim
to which he was otherwise perfectly entitled." 8
Or consider the controversial New Jersey case of Kelleher v.
Loz.i.1 ' Lozzi's suit against Kelleher for injuries from an inter-
section collision was settled and dismissed after the pre-trial con-
ference. Subsequently Kelleher brought suit against Lozzi for dam-
ages suffered in the same collision. Counterclaims are not compul-
sory in tort cases in New Jersey. Nevertheless the New Jersey
Supreme Court found that Kelleher was barred by the settlement
of Lozzi's suit:
"By her own act in surrendering the contest, making her settle-
ment and as a part thereof taking from her adversary his under-
taking to release her from further liability she conceded that she,
and she alone, was the wrongdoer. * * * By every fair expecta-
tion the question of Lozzi's negligence as between him and
Kelleher was settled in the negative by the parties inter sese.
* * * It is logically and factually impossible to reconcile a valid
claim by Kelleher with a valid claim by Lozzi. * * * [S] he was
not at liberty so to pursue her elective courses that she could
lead the plaintiff into a settlement and the giving of a release
with the reasonable and logical expectation that by this joint
undertaking of the parties their litigable differences were ended
and then, on the finely spun distinction that she was about to
litigate her claim, not his, revive an issue which she had re-
solved against herself."'160
The Kelleher case has been distinguished in several later deci-
sions by inferior New Jersey courts on the grounds that the settle-
ment in that case was made by Kelleher herself, rather than by her
insurer.""' Though this may appear to be true from a mere reading
of the opinion, it is not actually the fact. Kelleher sought a rehearing
to show that the settlement with Lozzi was entered into by her in-
surer without her consent, but rehearing was denied. 16 2
The cases just considered are not unique. A consent judgment
for plaintiff in Georgia, agreed to by defendant's insurer, bars de-
fendant from suing for his own injuries in Alabama. 16 3 A losing
defendant in Minnesota is precluded by collateral estoppel from
158. Ross v. Stricker, 153 Ohio St. 153, 91 N. E. 2d 18 (1950).
159. 7 N. J. 17, 80 A. 2d 196 (1951), approved 6 Rutgers L. Rev. 474(1952), criticized 51 Col. L. Rev. 1062 (1951), 52 Col. L. Rev. 647, 657 n.55 (1952).
160. 7 N. J. at 23-24, 29, 80 A. 2d at 199, 202.
161. Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N. J. Super. 95, 86 A 2d 695 (1952) ; De
Carlucci v. Brasley, 16 N. J. Super. 48, 83 A. 2d 823 (1951).
162. Kelleher v. Lozzi, Docket No. 765, N. J. Sup. Ct., May 14, 1951.




bringing his own action even though his insurer paid the verdict in
the first action, rather than letting judgment be entered and ap-
pealing therefrom, against the wishes of the insured.0 4 In Massa-
chusetts a consent judgment agreed to by defendant's insurer was
held to bar subsequent suit by the insured 65 until the legislature
intervened to require a different result. 66
It is true that a number of cases hold that an insurer and its
attorney are not the agents of the insured, and thus can neither
bind nor estop the insured by any agreement they make with the
opposing party. 167 And it is equally true that some authorities
would hold that a settlement made by the defendant personally
should not bar him from subsequent suit,6 s or at worst that the
intent of the parties in making the settlement should be a jury
question. 69 We need not weigh the merits of the opposing positions
on these points. This discussion has been presented only to show
that even without a compulsory counterclaim rule, there are ample
opportunities in many jurisdictions for an insurer to affect adverse-
ly the claim of its insured.
These are all applications of the rule that res judicata is a trap
for the unwary. Suppose we have no compulsory counterclaim rule,
and plaintiff's claim, in a typical collision case, is tried without a
counterclaim being imposed. Suppose further that the jury finds
for plaintiff, either because of an incompetent defense by the attor-
ney for defendant's insurer, or because, in the absence of a counter-
claim, the jury does not know of defendant's injuries and claim,
and is carried away by the usual sympathy of jurors for claimants.
164. Miller v. Simons, 59 N. W. 2d 837 (Minn. 1953).
165. Biggio v. Magee, 272 Mass. 185, 172 N. E. 336 (1930). And in Long
v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931), it was held
that the insured thus deprived of his claim has no remedy against his insurer.
166. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 231, § 140A (Supp. 1952). This law was
originally enacted in 1932 on the recommendation of the Judicial Council. 7
Ann. Rep. Mass. Jud. Corn. 32-33 (1931).
167. Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448, 248 S. W. 2d 362 (1953) ; Foremost
Dairies Inc. v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500, 196 S. E. 279 (1938) ;
Burnham v. Williams, 198 Mo. App. 18, 194 S. W. 751 (1917) ; Countryman
v. Breen, 241 App. Div. 392, 271 N. Y. Supp. 744 (4th Dep't 1934), aff'd, 268
N. Y. 643, 198 N. E. 536 (1935); Emery v. Litchard, 137 Misc. 885, 245
N. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct 1930); Haluka v. Baker, 66 Ohio App. 308, 34
N. E. 2d 68 (1941) ; Jetton v. Polk, 17 Tenn. App. 395, 68 S. W. 2d 127(1933), cert. denied, Tenn. Sup. Ct, Feb. 24, 1934; cf. U. S. A. C. Trans-
port, Inc. v. Corley, 202 F. 2d 8 (5th Cir. 1953) (court bound by declaration
of Georgia law in Foremost Dairies case supra); 51 Col. L. Rev. 1062(1951).
168. Ross v. Fishtine, 277 Mass. 87, 177 N. E. 811 (1931). Contra:
Giles v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 540, 56 S. E. 2d 860 (1949) ; 6 Rutgers L. Rev.
474 (1952).
169. Hellstrom v. McCollum, 324 Ill. App. 385, 58 N. E. 2d 295 (1944);
Hayhurst v. Embrey, 46 Ohio Abs. 357, 65 N. E. 2d 660 (1946) ; Note, 52
Col. L. Rev. 647, 657 (1952).
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Everyone agrees that under these circumstances the verdict in the
first action will be held to have established conclusively defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's freedom from negligence. Thus defendant
will be estopped from presenting his own claim just as effectively
as if there had been a compulsory counterclaim rule. 70 Indeed the
stated reason for the adoption of the compulsory counterclaim rule
in Florida was to put an end to the practice by which the party to a
collision who had only minor injuries rushed to a justice of the
peace and got an adjudication of liability before the other party,
who had serious injuries, could get to issue in a court of general
jurisdiction.' 7' Then the judgment by the J.P. became a bar to the
second suit.
The stated rule is that the defendant is free to sue on his inde-
pendent claim if his defense in the action against him is success-
ful.1 72 But even this is far from certain. A New York commentator,
after examining the case law of that state, concludes that attorneys
for defendant cannot overlook any possible claim which their clients
may have for affirmative relief; although there is no provision as
such for compulsory counterclaims in New York, the doctrine of
res judicata may so operate as to compel the counterclaimY.7 3 Be-
cause of frequent judicial statements that in actions between the
same parties the judgment is res judicata as to all points which
might properly have been raised and adjudicated, the defendant
withholds his counterclaim at his peril. 7 4 Indeed it is quite well
settled that where the defendant has used the matter on which he
relies for his own claim as a defense to an earlier claim by the other
party, his own suit is barred by the rule against splitting a cause of
170. E.g. A. B. C. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So.
2d 511 (1946) ; Ross v. Stricker, 153 Ohio St. 153, 91 N. E. 2d 18 (1950) ;
Restatement, Judgments § 58, comment c (1942) ; Scott, supra note 36, at
26-28 Note, 52 Col. L. Rev. 647, 648 (1952).
1h. Fabisinski, Counterclaim Under Florida Statutes, 17 Fla. L. J. 160,
161 (1943). For example of this kind of evil, see Allamong v. Falkenhof,
30 Ohio App. 515, 177 N. E. 789 (1930), where the municipal court judg-
ment for F's property damage was held to bar A's suit in district court for
personal injuries. See cases to the same effect in 2 Moore, Federal Practiceff 2.06 [6] n. 88 (2d ed. 1948).
172. E.g., Seager v. Foster, 185 Iowa 32, 169 N. W. 681 (1918); Re-
statement, Judgments § 58, comment d (1942) ; Scott, supra note 36, at 26-28;
Note, 8 A. L. R. 694 (1920).
173. Note, Effect in New York of Non-Assertion of Counterclaim, 3
Syracuse L. Rev. 307, 315 (1952).
174. E.g., Holman v. Tjosevig, 136 Wash. 261, 239 Pac. 545 (1925),
criticized 39 Harv. L. Rev. 658 (1926) ; see Brunswick Drug Co. v. Springer,
55 Cal. App. 2d 444, 449-450, 130 P. 2d 758 (1942) ; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Hathaway Baking Co., 306 Mass. 428, 434, 28 N. E. 2d 425, 429 (1940) ;
Paccalona v. Peninsula Bank & Lumber Co., 171 Mich. 605, 607, 137 N. W.
518, 519 (1912) ; Paulson v. Oregon Surety & Casualty Co., 70 Ore. 175, 180,
138 Pac. 838, 839 (1914) ; Commentary, The "Compulsory" Counterclaim, 5
Fed. Rules Serv. 807, 808 (1942).
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action 17 5 though I have not seen any application of this rule to
negligence actions. This is an example of the famous statement of
Chief Justice Shaw:





What does this rather rambling discussion as to the perils of
res judicata add up to? It adds up, I think, to a conclusion that
even without a rule making counterclaims compulsory, defendants
are in considerable danger of having their claims barred if they fail
to plead them as counterclaims. Further it indicates that there are
already ample opportunities for insurers to jeopardize their in-
sured's claim by ignoring his interest and looking only to their own.
The cure for the difficulties some see in applying the compulsory
counterclaim rule to cases defended by an insurer is not to exempt
insurers from the operation of a device otherwise thought to be in
the public interest. 7 7 It is to demand of insurers a good faith con-
cern in the welfare of their policyholders. No one asks the insurer
to bear the expense of prosecuting the insured's counterclaim. But is
it too much to require that the insurer's attorney advise the de-
fendant that his rights may be foreclosed by a failure to counter-
claim, and that he should consult an attorney of his own, just as
similar advice is now given when a suit exceeds the policy limits?
Is it asking too much of the insurer to require him to notify the
insured of his intention to settle plaintiff's claim, so that the insured
may commence his own action or assert his counterclaim before he
is barred by an agreement to which he is not a party? It is true
that this latter policy will cost insurance companies money, for
claimants may properly settle for a small sum in compromise of
an entire controversy, but demand more when they know suit
against them by the opposite party will still go on. Yet when the
insurer makes the settlement for the low figure, without the knowl-
edge or consent of its insured, and thus bars the insured's action,
the company is actually saving money at the expense of its policy
holder. Though the company is properly entitled to protect its own
interest in minimizing its liability, it should not be entitled to do
175. E.g., Mitchell v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Columbia,
165 S. C. 457, 164 S. E. 136 (1932) ; Leslie v. Mollica, 236 Mich. 610, 211
N. W. 267 (1926) ; Note, 83 A. L. R. 642 (1933).
176. O'Connor v. Varney, 10 Gray 231 (Mass. 1857).
177. This had been the recommendation of the Court Rules Committee
of the Minnesota State Bar Association, 10 Bench and Bar of Minnesota 35(May 1953), but as pointed out at note 154 supra, the Committee has now
rescinded its earlier action and recommended that tort cases be regarded as
within the compulsory counterclaim rule whether or not an insurer is involved.
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so at the cost of its insured. 78 This duty of good faith on insurers
would, of course, have to be enforced by giving policy holders a
remedy for its breach, but such a remedy should not be difficult to
work out. 7 9
The course outlined would provide a sound and workable solu-
tion to the problem of the insured defendant. With this problem
disposed of, the arguments previously presented for compelling
counterclaims in collision cases, and in negligence cases generally,
seem unanswerable.
CONCLUSION
Compulsory counterclaim rules may at first blush appear harsh.
On their face they are opposed to the dominant trend in procedure
today which is to get away from penalizing a party's procedural
errors by an adverse judgment against an otherwise meritorious
claim. Yet such rules are an important part of the movement to
end a multiplicity of litigation, and thus are in the interest of both
litigants and the public. Since there is never any need for a party
to incur the penalty for failure to counterclaim, and since there are
ample remedies for the party who has so acted through inadvert-
ence, the actual working of the rules has not been harsh. Their
salutary effect has been had with comparatively little injustice, even
during the period when such rules have been new and unfamiliar.
Courts have almost uniformly given compulsory rules a liberal
construction. This trend should continue, as should the trend for
more and more states to adopt such rules.
178. The case of O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P. 2d 483
(1946), holding that where one company insures both parties to a collision,
it is not entitled to represent or to control the defense of either, is suggestive.
If insurers are free to minimize their own liability, without regard to the in-
terests of their insureds, one would suppose that the company would be free
in the situation presented to control both parties and get out without paying
anything.
179. A similar remedy has been invented for bad faith in refusing to
settle a claim within the policy limits. Note, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 150 (1950)
see also Note, 60 Yale L. J. 1037 (1951). Such a remedy was denied in the
circumstances with which the present article has been concerned in the case
of Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931), where
the court looked only for negligence rather than bad faith. That this case may
not be conclusive is indicated by the hints now frequently appearing that such
a remedy may be available. Miller v. Simons, 59 N. W. 2d 837, 840 (Minn.
1953) ; Keller v. Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 925, 244 S. W. 2d 1001, 1004 (1951) ;
51 Col. L. Rev. 1062, 1063 (1951). Might there not also be a malpractice
action against the attorney provided by the insurer, since when an attorney is
allowed to represent conflicting interests, as here, it is said to be essential
that he deal fairly with both interests? Note, The Bases of the Attorney's
Liability to His Client for Malpractice, 37 Va. L. Rev. 429, 435 (1951).
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